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Global climate change, resulting from the global
accumulation of heat-trapping greenhouse gases, has not only
become a dominant environmental issue, it is becoming a defining
international and social issue. Not only does the prospect of global
climate change present potential environmental changes on a scale
not seen in recorded history, but the challenges for international
social order are unprecedented. Never before in the history of
international relations have the nations of the world been
confronted with an environmental risk with implications that are so
far-reaching in both space and time. And with the sweeping past
and prospective inequalities around the world in wealth and human
welfare that are somehow connected to the problem of climate
change, other international social issues begin to pale in
comparative significance.
Exactly why the nations of the world have had difficulty in
reaching agreement on limiting greenhouse gas emissions is
something of a puzzle. An economic argument can be made that
the world will continue to grow wealthier, as it has for centuries,1
so that reducing greenhouse gas emissions now to avoid climate
impacts in the future would essentially be transferring wealth to an
even wealthier future generation.2 However, there are non-trivial
1
Most integrated assessment models—models that link a model of
greenhouse gas emissions and climate change with a model of economic
activity—build in fairly standard models of economic growth, which most
economists believe will continue even in the face of a changed climate. Thomas
Sterner & U. Martin Persson, An Even Sterner Review: Introducing Relative
Prices into the Discounting Debate, 2 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 61, 63 (2008)
(“Most economists, including Stern, appear to believe we will have much higher
incomes in the future, despite climate change. But the risk of perhaps being only
eleven—instead of thirteen—times as rich in the year 2200 is unlikely to get
many people upset about climate change.”); see also WILLIAM NORDHAUS, A
QUESTION OF BALANCE 108 (2008) (“First, the model assumes continued rapid
economic growth in the years ahead, although with slightly slower growth than
over the past four decades.”). Nicholas Stern, in his widely discussed
commissioned report, is less transparent about his assumptions regarding
economic growth, but he clearly believes that economic growth will continue
even in the face of climate change (assuming that catastrophes do not cripple
economies). See NICHOLAS STERN, STERN REVIEW ON THE ECONOMICS OF
CLIMATE CHANGE 35 fig.2.3 (2007) [hereinafter STERN REVIEW] (showing a
conceptual graph of economic growth paths, with a higher long-term growth path
if greenhouse gas mitigation is undertaken), available at http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/stern_review_report.htm.
2
This argument was first and most eloquently made by Nobel Laureate and
economist Thomas Schelling. Schelling, Intergenerational Discounting, 23
ENERGY POL’Y 395 (1995).
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risks that the effects of climate change will be catastrophic, and if
the current rates of climate change continue, future generations
will face a significant and continuing loss in average welfare.3 For
one thing, as higher global temperatures increasingly degrade
environmental quality, the marginal value of environmental quality
increases, making further environmental deteriorations more costly
than typically estimated by economic models.4
But more
frighteningly, global climate change is alone among environmental
problems in posing the risk of such vast environmental changes
that the effects could destabilize entire economies, countries, and
regions. Some studies of future climate impacts project some dire
possibilities: global consumption could fall to less than 1 percent
of current levels.5 This is not future generations doing without
four-terabyte iPods; this is future generations in developed
countries having to queue up for food and drinking water.
Economist Martin Weitzman has observed that even if the
probability of these kinds of outcomes is quite small, some
precautions might be warranted, even if they might not seem
warranted under traditional cost-benefit analyses.6
Even a small risk of such calamity should be enough to
compel the nations of the world to agree to some fundamental, and
in many cases ridiculously cheap, ways of reducing greenhouse
gas emissions.7 Robust insurance markets exist for risks far less
3
See Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of
Catastrophic Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2009).
4
See Sterner & Persson, supra note 1, at 62.
5
Most notably, twenty-two studies reviewed by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change, a United Nations-appointed body, see infra note 11,
have been the basis of much economic discussion, and have formed a de facto set
of baseline projections. The projections have been used by a number of
economists considering the costs and benefits of reducing greenhouse gas
emissions, including William Nordhaus and Nicholas Stern, two prominent
representatives of polar viewpoints on the costs and benefits of greenhouse gas
reduction. See generally NORDHAUS supra note 1; STERN REVIEW, supra note 1.
These studies are most carefully reviewed, however, by Martin Weitzman. See
Weitzman, supra note 3.
6
See Weitzman, supra note 3, at 13 (drawing upon twenty-two studies
reviewed by the I.P.C.C. in its report, see infra note 11, and adding some
analysis of possible positive feedback effects, following Torn and Harte, see
infra note 13.
7
Many energy efficiencies would not only reduce emissions, but more than
pay for themselves. A recent report by the consulting firm McKinsey &
Company found that, of forty greenhouse gas abatement strategies studied,
seventeen had a negative cost, meaning that they represent net gains independent
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important than the risks of cataclysmic climate change. So why
are the nations of the world seemingly unable to come together to
collectively buy a small amount of insurance?
Political economy arguments are obviously compelling. It is
not news that industry-based interest groups can hijack an entire
polity and prevent it from pursuing its own best collective
interests. On climate change, some industries and interest groups
have used a variety of political and psychological means to stall
regulation of greenhouse gases.8 But even assuming the most
craven industrial self-interests, the risk of catastrophe and the fact
that these industries and interest groups are exposed to the same
risks as everyone else seem to suggest that political economy
explanations alone are insufficient to explain the collective
paralysis.
Another common account is that the transaction costs of
solving such a monumental collective action problem are simply
too great to overcome.9 However, the transaction costs of
negotiation are not, in fact, prohibitively large, especially given the
fact that an international framework has been in place for nearly
two decades, and fifteen subsequent international negotiating
rounds have been held to hammer out agreements. Given the
magnitude of the risk, and the availability of institutions for
negotiating international agreements, a transaction cost
explanation seems unsatisfying.
This Article argues that a new theory of international climate
change negotiations is needed, and draws upon economic game
theory to supply one. A number of papers have applied game
of their greenhouse gas-reducing potential. MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A
LOW-CARBON ECONOMY 7 ex. 1 (2009). For example, an estimated three trillion
cubic feet of natural gas is lost to leakage each year. Sealing leaks is believed to
largely pay for itself by saving natural gas. Andrew C. Revkin & Clifford
Krauss, Curbing Emission by Sealing Gas Leaks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2009, at
A1. Total leakage from fossil fuel extraction and distribution builds about 4
percent of global greenhouse gas emissions annually. STERN REVIEW, supra note
1, at 275 box 12.3.
8
For example, ExxonMobil and a number of other firms have contributed to
a campaign that highlights, in a misleading fashion, the scientific uncertainties of
climate change and the human contributions to climate change. See infra notes
43–44 and accompanying text.
9
See, e.g., Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and the Imperative of
Enforcement, in THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 79 (Dieter
Helm & Cameron Hepburn eds., 2009); TODD SANDLER, GLOBAL COLLECTIVE
ACTION 223–25 (2004).
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theory to the problem of international climate negotiations.10 This
is an obvious fit, since international climate negotiations are
strongly driven by strategic interdependencies. What China will
do with respect to greenhouse gas emissions depends critically on
what the United States will do. What developing countries are
willing to commit depends critically on what the developed nations
of the world are willing to commit. The existing game-theoretic
literature, however, has tended to model one strategic interaction at
a time. This Article sets forth a more general, and yet simpler,
model, one that can be tweaked to model a number of different
strategic interactions. In that sense the model in this Article aims
to be more fundamental and more general than previous gametheoretic modeling exercises in international climate negotiations.
Part I of this Article introduces the problem of climate change
and the response, and suggests that the response has been
puzzlingly inadequate. Part II presents some possible approaches
to explaining the failure of countries to agree to reductions in
greenhouse gases, including the game-theoretic approach adopted
by this Article. Part III sets out some of the idiosyncrasies of the
climate change problem, explaining the challenges they pose for
modeling international climate negotiations. Part IV sets out the
proposed model. Part V undertakes the bulk of the analysis in this
Article: given a simple game-theoretic model, what happens when
10

For some of the game-theoretic treatments to date see SCOTT BARRETT,
ENVIRONMENT AND STATECRAFT (2005); Barbara Buchner & Carlo Carraro,
Parallel Climate Blocs: Incentives to Cooperation in International Climate
Negotiations, in THE DESIGN OF CLIMATE POLICY (Roger Guesnerie & Henry
Tulkens eds., 2009); Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, Cooperation, Stability,
and Self-Enforcement in International Environmental Agreements, in THE
DESIGN OF CLIMATE POLICY (Roger Guesnerie & Henry Tulkens eds., 2009);
SANDLER, supra note 9; Carlo Carraro & Domenico Siniscalco, Strategies for the
International Protection of the Environment, 52 J. PUB. ECON. 309 (1993);
William D. Nordhaus & Zili Yang, A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium
Model of Alternative Climate Change Strategies, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 741 (1996);
Carlo Carraro & Francesca Moriconi, International Games on Climate Change
Control (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 1988.022, 1998),
available
at
http://www.feem.it/userfiles/attach/Publication/NDL1998/NDL1998-022.pdf;
Steven Stoft, Game Theory for Global Climate Policy (Global Energy Policy
Ctr., Research Paper No. 10-04, 2010), available at http://www.globalenergy.org/lib/2010/ge1004-climate-game-theory-background-stoft.pdf;
Peter
John Wood, Climate Change and Game Theory (Environmental Economics
Research Hub, Research Report No. 62, 2010), available at
http://www.crawford.anu.edu.au/research_units/eerh/pdf/EERH_RR62.pdf, and
see also the WITCH Model discussed infra at note 52.
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the few parameters of the model are perturbed or the assumptions
relaxed? This kind of modeling sensitivity analysis is the key to
understanding some behaviors in the international climate arena.
Part VI offers some concluding remarks.
INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM AND THE RESPONSE
Sobering scientific projections are reported in the Fourth
Assessment of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC), released in 2007.11 Not yet accounting for some positive
feedback mechanisms that may make the projections too optimistic
(and which more recent evidence suggests are more likely and
more troubling than previously thought12), the IPCC’s mean
estimate of the increase in global average temperatures by the end
of the century is an increase of 3° C, but it warns that a
temperature rise of more than 4.5° C “cannot be excluded.”14
Indeed, some peer-reviewed studies cited by the IPCC in its Fourth
Assessment report consider the possibility of much higher
temperature increases, giving rise to temperatures that exceed the
ranges of temperatures ever experienced by human civilization.15
There are a number of potentially cataclysmic effects of
climate change, and almost all of them are global threats. They
include a rise in sea levels,16 inundating coastal areas and

11

INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, Summary for
Policymakers, in CLIMATE CHANGE 2007: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS;
CONTRIBUTION OF WORKING GROUP I TO THE FOURTH ASSESSMENT REPORT OF
THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (S. Solomon, D. Qin, M.
Manning, Z. Chen, M. Marquis, K.B. Averyt, M.Tignor & H.L. Miller eds.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) [hereinafter FOURTH ASSESSMENT], available at
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg1/ar4-wg1-spm.pdf. The IPCC
is a United Nations-appointed body of hundreds of scientists engaged in the
science of climate change. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE,
www.ipcc.ch (last visited Oct. 24, 2010). Though often criticized, the IPCC was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, along with former U.S. Vice President Al Gore,
in 2007.
12
Margaret S. Torn & John Harte, Missing Feedbacks, Asymmetric
Uncertainties, and the Underestimation of Future Warming, 33 GEOPHYSICAL
RES. LETTERS, at L10703 (2006).
14
FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 65.
15
STERN REVIEW, supra, note 1, at 9 (studies summarized in box 1.2).
16
ROBERT HENSON, THE ROUGH GUIDE TO CLIMATE CHANGE 111–17 (2d
ed., 2008).
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endangering trillions of dollars of real estate.17 Coastal cities in
affluent societies could, at considerable cost, insulate themselves
by erecting sea walls, but many places in the world cannot afford
such a fix.
Another worrying effect of climate change is a change in
rainfall patterns so that parts of the world experience increased
frequency and severity of droughts.18 While the total amount of
rainfall worldwide should not change substantially, where and
when it falls may change enough to severely disrupt local or
regional weather patterns and the ability of some regions to store
and utilize water. Again, some measures can be taken to minimize
the costs, such as increased storage and more efficient utilization
of water, but there is only so much that human societies can do
without adequate supplies of water. Decreased precipitation
leading to loss of glacial mass will also jeopardize economies built
on hydroelectric power fed by glacial runoff.19 The flipside of the
water shortage problem is the probable increase in the frequency of
severe storm events,20 which will challenge the ability of many
countries to rescue their populations from calamity. While the
U.S. learned some lessons in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina,
an increase in the number and severity of hurricanes may again
make a mockery of American disaster relief efforts. One wonders
what countries such as Indonesia and Bangladesh would do. And
none of this accounts for effects on vital ecosystems, such as
wetlands and oceans, which play important yet poorly-understood
roles in regulating climate.
In short, the problem with climate change is that it threatens
so many systems globally. The breadth of risk and the scope of

17

TIM LENTON, ANTHONY FOOTITT & ANDREW DLUGOLECKI, MAJOR TIPPING
POINTS IN THE EARTH’S CLIMATE SYSTEM AND CONSEQUENCES FOR THE
INSURANCE SECTOR 76–77 (2009), available at http://knowledge.allianz.com/
nopi_downloads/downloads/TP_Final_report.pdf.
18
HENSON, supra note 16, at 59.
19
In British Columbia, for example, the Energy Plan aims to ensure that
clean energy, including hydroelectric power, accounts for over 90 percent of the
province’s electricity consumption. See BRITISH COLUMBIA MINISTRY OF
ENERGY, MINES AND PETROLEUM RESOURCES, THE BC ENERGY PLAN: A VISION
FOR
CLEAN
ENERGY
LEADERSHIP
3
(2007),
available
at
http://www.energyplan.gov.bc.ca/PDF/BC_Energy_Plan.pdf.
20
FOURTH ASSESSMENT, supra note 11, at 782–84; see also HENSON, supra
note 16, at 130, 135 (discussing growing evidence of an increase in number of
intense hurricanes and typhoons).
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potential changes to the biosphere threaten huge and possibly
critical ecosystems and key components of the Earth’s
fundamental life systems. The risk posed by climate change is
truly global, and affects every individual on the planet.
None of this is news to international diplomats and
lawmakers. Efforts to address climate change have been underway
for nearly two decades. The 1992 United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, an international agreement to
agree, contemplated the subsequent negotiation of more concrete
and more binding agreements. Only the third Conference of
Parties, however, produced anything resembling an agreement to
reduce emissions: the Kyoto Protocol.21 The Kyoto Protocol sets
out a schedule of emissions reductions for the world’s developed
countries, the only concrete expectations that have been expressed
with respect to reducing emissions. Yet, Kyoto has been the
subject of intense criticism for a number of flaws,22 including its
lack of any obligations for developing countries23 (a major reason
for reluctance on the part of the U.S. to commit to binding
emissions reductions targets),24 its perverse incentive to
21

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, U.N. Doc FCCC/CP1997/L.7/Add. 1, 37 I.L.M. 22
(1998), available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf.
22
See, e.g., DAVID G. VICTOR, THE COLLAPSE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND
THE STRUGGLE TO SLOW GLOBAL WARMING 24 (2001) (criticizing the Kyoto
Protocol for being too costly and for harming national democracies); William D.
Nordhaus, After Kyoto: Alternative Mechanisms to Control Global Warming, 96
AM. ECON. REV. 31 (2006) (arguing global harmonized GHG taxes are better for
emissions control than the Kyoto Protocol’s country-specific limits); Stephen M.
Gardiner, The Global Warming Tragedy and the Dangerous Illusion of the Kyoto
Protocol, 18 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 23 (2004) (arguing the Kyoto Protocol failed
to sufficiently take into account interests of future generations); Sheila M.
Olmstead and Robert N. Stavins, An International Policy Architecture for the
Post-Kyoto Era, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 35 (2006) (arguing the Kyoto Protocol
imposed higher costs than would result from long term targets that reduced
emissions less in the short term and more in the long term than Kyoto).
23
See RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, RECONSTRUCTING
CLIMATE POLICY 88–89 (2003).
24
President Obama, who had sought federal climate change legislation in the
U.S., said the following in Copenhagen:
“[W]hat’s happened obviously since 1992 is that you’ve got emerging
countries like China and India and Brazil that have seen enormous
economic growth and industrialization. So we know that moving
forward it’s going to be necessary if we’re going to meet those targets
for some changes to take place among those countries. It’s not enough
just for the developed countries to make changes. Those countries are
going to have to make some changes, as well—not of the same pace,
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discourage the meaningful post-Kyoto participation of developing
countries,25 and, most of all, its lack of any sanctions for
noncompliance.26 Because failing to meet Kyoto’s countryspecific emissions targets carries no sanctions, there has been no
incentive to actually comply with the Kyoto Protocol. Canada, for
example, ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, committing to a 6
percent reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions from 1990
levels, and then continued on its trajectory of increasing its
greenhouse gas emissions, so that in 2005 it emitted 25 percent
more in CO2-equivalent emissions27 than it did in 1990.28 And
not in the same way, but they’re going to have to do something to
assure that whatever carbon we’re taking out of the environment is not
just simply dumped in by other parties.”
Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President during Press
Availability in Copenhagen (Dec. 18, 2009) (emphasis added), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-during-pressavailability-copenhagen. See also Lisa Friedman, Potholes in the Road to
Copenhagen Grow in Bangkok Talks, CLIMATEWIRE, Oct. 9, 2009 (discussing
“America’s terms” that “[m]ajor developing nations must make legally binding
commitments to temper their own global warming pollution”).
25
Steven Stoft, The Cause of the War over Caps and How to End It, GLOBAL
ENERGY POLICY CENTER 1 (2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1427665
(pointing out that the cap-and-trade program under Kyoto, along with the Clean
Development Mechanism, creates a strong disincentive for developing countries
to commit to a future national cap in a post-Kyoto regime).
26
See BARRETT, supra note 10, at 360–62 (“[The] Kyoto Protocol is unlikely
to sustain meaningful cooperation. This is not for the reasons usually given—that
Kyoto will do little to moderate climate change, that monitoring of the agreement
will be imperfect, that its mechanisms are too complicated, and that its
implementation will be too costly—though these criticisms are also valid. The
main strike against Kyoto is the most crucial of all: the agreement fails to solve
the enforcement problem.”).
27
CO2-equivalent emissions, or carbon dioxide-equivalents, represent an
index of total emissions from all six greenhouse gases regulated under the Kyoto
Protocol, which include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxides,
hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. The index is
weighted by the heat-trapping effect of emissions of the different greenhouse
gases, in comparison with the effect of a ton of carbon dioxide. For example,
since methane has twenty-one times the heat-trapping power of carbon dioxide,
emissions of methane are multiplied by twenty-one for purposes of calculating
the index. Also, in terms of emissions trading under Kyoto, emissions of
methane will be deemed to be twenty-one times as important as the equivalent
emissions of carbon dioxide. See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EMISSION
FACTS: METRICS FOR EXPRESSING GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS: CARBON
EQUIVALENTS AND CARBON DIOXIDE EQUIVALENTS (2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/oms/climate/420f05002.htm (discussing use of carbon
dioxide equivalent metric).
28
ENVIRONMENT CANADA, NATIONAL INVENTORY REPORT 3 (2007),
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with no means of controlling emissions leakage—the transfer of
emissions from countries that regulate or price greenhouse gas
emissions to countries that do not—Kyoto offers no assurances to
countries undertaking costly mitigation measures that their efforts
will be effective. Although negotiations in Copenhagen last year
did yield a monitoring and “transparency” agreement among some
important emitters—most notably the U.S., China, India, and
South Africa—it did not, as had been long planned, produce a
successor treaty to Kyoto. Most significantly, Kyoto has not
actually delivered any significant emissions reductions.29
I. WHY HAVE INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS FAILED?
The question is not why the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol are failures in the
international legal sense. The question is rather why international
efforts at negotiation have produced such flawed efforts.
International agreement, especially among countries that are so
diversely situated, is always difficult. And this is not to say that as
a normative matter, the world is unambiguously better off if
cooperation is achieved in reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
But given the apparent stakes, the puerile behavior and bombastic
posturing of the world’s leaders and negotiators is a headscratcher.30 This Article undertakes the descriptive task of
available at http://www.ec.gc.ca/Publications/default.asp?lang=En&xml=
E80FB0A6-A0C2-4E6E-A12E-005D50D041C5. This precludes Canada from
realistically being able to comply with its Kyoto mandate of reducing its
emissions to 6 percent below 1990 levels, or 560 megatons.
29
Greenhouse gas emissions tend to track economic activity, which declines
during economic downturns, such as the one in 2008 and 2009. See, e.g., U.S.
ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., SHORT-TERM ENERGY OUTLOOK SUPPLEMENT:
UNDERSTANDING THE DECLINE IN CARBON DIOXIDE EMISSIONS IN 2009, at 1
(2009) (reporting expected 5.9 percent decline from 2008); Press Release, U.S.
Energy Info. Admin., U.S. Greenhouse Gas Emissions Decreased by 2.2 Percent
in 2008 (Dec. 3, 2009), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/press/
press333 html. As of 2007, one year before the Kyoto compliance period of
2008–2012, world carbon dioxide emissions were 30.56 gigatons. Climate
Analysis Indicators Tool, WORLD RESOURCES INST., http://cait.wri.org (last
visited May 24, 2011) (obtained by dividing China’s emissions by its fraction of
world total). In 1997, the year of the signing (not ratification) of the Kyoto
Protocol, world emissions were 23.64 gigatons. Id. (obtained by dividing the
United States’ emissions by its fraction of the world total).
30
For example, during negotiations at the Copenhagen conference of parties,
Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao snubbed world leaders by sending an aide instead
of attending in person, prompting President Obama to raise his voice to the
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explaining why cooperation has been elusive.
One explanation that has been offered for the failure of
international climate negotiations is that climate change is a
massive collective action problem, and the transaction costs of
finding agreement on greenhouse gas emissions reductions are too
great.31 A simple economic account of the climate change problem
would be that because the benefits of emitting greenhouse gases
are internalized within a country, but the costs spread out among
the entire world (albeit at different levels of harm across countries
and socioeconomic strata), emitting greenhouse gases is an oversupplied activity. Correcting the oversupply problem, however, is
challenged by the costs of organizing negotiations, and actually
undertaking those negotiations. But this explanation would seem
to fall short, as the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, while
flawed, at least reduce the transaction costs of organizing and
negotiating.
These institutions change the outcomes of
uncooperative games so that cooperation becomes not only
possible, but likely.32 Coasean bargaining only succumbs to
transaction cost problems if the transaction costs exceed the
potential gains from trade. Insuring against the large risks posed
by climate change would seem to present large enough upsides to
overcome the transaction costs of bargaining, at least those having
to do with negotiation costs. If, on the other hand, strategic
behavior is the problem, then this article proposes an analytical
way forward.
More compelling might be a political economy explanation
focusing on the domestic politics of climate change. Domestic
politics can greatly complicate the task before international
negotiators. The Byrd-Hagel resolution, a non-binding “sense of
the Senate” resolution, declared that the United States should not
be a party to any agreement to reduce emission that would not also
Premier, asking, “Mr. Premier, are you ready to see me?” Peter Maer,
Impromptu Moments Shaped Copenhagen Accord, CBS NEWS, Dec. 20, 2009,
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/12/20/politics/main6000506.shtml.
31
See SANDLER, supra note 9, at 223–25; Barrett, supra note 9, at 79; Daniel
H. Cole, Climate Change and Collective Action, 61 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS.
2008 229, 231–32 (2009) (suggesting collective action problem impedes
negotiation of effective climate change agreements).
32
See Daniel H. Cole & Peter Z. Grossman, Institutions Matter! Why the
Herder Problem Is not a Prisoner’s Dilemma, 69 THEORY & DECISION 219, 223–
24, 226 (2010) (explaining that “institutions shape the payoffs, incentives, and
dominant strategies of players in all games”).
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require emissions reductions of developing countries.33 That
resolution certainly complicated the efforts of American climate
change negotiators. In 2009, with a Democratic President
committed to climate change legislation, and a Democratcontrolled House of Representatives and Senate, climate change
legislation passed the House of Representatives34 only with
enormous concessions extracted by a variety of sectors and
populations.35 In 2010, a similar Senate effort ended in failure in
the wake of strong opposition to climate regulation,36 a failure that
has triggered blame from other countries for the disappointing
progress made in post-Copenhagen negotiations.37 This problem is
not limited to democracies: even China, heretofore resistant to
committing to binding greenhouse gas emissions limitations,
sometimes has found it a challenge to speak with one voice.38
China’s stark divide between affluent regions vulnerable to climate
change and poor regions interested only in economic growth has
given rise to a division of opinion on how keenly the country
wishes to pursue greenhouse gas mitigation policies.39
But even severe internal divisions within a country do not
support a pure political economy explanation. For one thing, there
would be the question of why those that have much to lose from
climate change could not make a transfer payment to those, such as
the oil and coal industries, that are opposed to greenhouse gas
33

S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997).
American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009) (Waxman-Markey Bill).
35
For one of many analyses of the Waxman-Markey bill and the political
concessions that were made in order to obtain passage, see Shi-Ling Hsu, Nine
Reasons to Adopt a Carbon Tax 9 (May 17, 2009) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1405944.
36
See Robin Bravender & Katie Howell, Reid Pronounces Climate Bill
Dead, Sees Hope for Energy Bill, GREENWIRE, Sept. 8, 2010,
http://www.eenews net/Greenwire/print/2010/09/08/4.
37
Lisa Friedman, U.S. Accuses Countries of ‘Walking Back’ from
Copenhagen Accord, CLIMATEWIRE, Aug. 9, 2010, http://www.eenews net/
climatewire/print/2010/08/09/5.
38
See Edward Wong & Jonathan Ansfield, China Insists That Its Steps on
Climate Be Voluntary, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2010, at A5 (noting that while a
Chinese negotiator at Copenhagen publicly scolded President Obama and
wagged his finger at Obama, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao told the
interpreter to ignore the official’s remarks).
39
Daniel Abebe & Jonathan Masur, International Agreements, Internal
Heterogeneity, and Climate Change: The Two Chinas Problem, 50 VA. J. INT’L.
L. 325 (2010).
34
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regulation. After all, the 2009 American Clean Energy and
Security Act (or Waxman-Markey, after the bill’s sponsors)40
included lavish legislative giveaways to coal-burning electric
utilities and other industries that would be negatively affected by
greenhouse gas regulation.41 Transfer payments could even be
transnational—they could flow from those with much to lose to
those that prefer economic development in another country. The
Kyoto Protocol has “flexibility mechanisms” such as the Clean
Development Mechanism, which provides for developed-country
funding of projects in developing countries that supposedly reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. While the Clean Development
Mechanism has come under intense criticism for not actually
producing emissions reductions,42 it still stands as evidence that
transnational transfer payments are possible, and even
institutionalized, within the UNFCCC framework.
A second reason that a political economy explanation seems
to fall short is that the threats of climate change are global, and no
one will be spared at least some serious ill effects. It may be true
that a personal cost-benefit analysis of whether one would favor
greenhouse gas mitigation at some personal cost would be vastly
different for differently-situated individuals throughout the world,
but climate change is not a trifling matter for anyone. And yet the
way that some interests seem to treat the issue suggests that the
impacts of climate change are irrelevant. The way that oil
companies and some other industries cravenly manipulated public
opinion in order to sow doubt about the scientific consensus
regarding climate change43 evinces little regard for a dangerous
truth that will ultimately affect these firms as much as others. For
example, political economy explanations do not explain the

40

American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2454, 111th Cong.
(2009).
41
The “grandfathering” of tradable emissions permits under WaxmanMarkey, or the free allocation of permits, was worth an estimated $378 billion.
35 percent of the grandfathered permits were allocated to electric utilities. Hsu,
supra note 35, at 9.
42
See, e.g., Michael W. Wara & David G. Victor, A Realistic Policy on
International Carbon Offsets (Program on Energy and Sustainable Dev. at
Freeman Spogli Inst. for Int’l Studies, Stanford Univ., Working Paper No. 74,
2008), available at http://iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/22157/WP74_final_final.pdf.
43
See Aaron M. McCright & Riley E. Dunlap, Defeating Kyoto: The
Conservative Movement’s Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy, 50 SOC.
PROBS. 348 (2003).
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difference between the approach taken by two of the largest
integrated petroleum products firms in the world: BP, which
sought to embrace a low-carbon future early on, and Exxon Mobil,
one of the leading opponents of greenhouse gas regulation and a
source of funding for detractors of climate change science.44 It
could well be that some firms, such as Exxon Mobil, would benefit
from a respite from greenhouse regulation to give them some time
to diversify their corporate investments into lower-carbon
industries. But on some level, even these firms must recognize
that the heroic measures that they are undertaking to derail
greenhouse gas regulation and foil global cooperation poses a
threat to the entire planet, including the firms themselves, which,
unlike human beings, could live on indefinitely. There is
something else going on other than a simple self-interested
gerrymandering of public policy.
A final possible explanation emerges from new research on
the psychological aspects of climate change, which suggests that
people simply may not believe that climate change is truly a
problem or a risk.45 If this is the case, then a proper response
would include a fairly radical set of public policies aimed at public
outreach and education, bridging a gap between what scientists
know and what the public knows. But this explanation also leaves
questions unanswered: do our national leaders and international
negotiators believe that climate change presents a serious risk? If
44
For an analysis comparing Exxon Mobil and BP Amoco, see Ian H
Rowlands, Beauty and the Beast? BP’s and Exxon’s Positions on Global Climate
Change, 18 ENV’T & PLAN. C: GOV’T & POL’Y 339 (2000); Ingvild Andreassen
Sæverud & Jon Birger Skjærseth, Oil Companies and Climate Change:
Inconsistencies Between Strategy Formulation and Implementation?, 7 GLOBAL
ENVTL. POL. 42 (2007). Exxon has funded the Global Climate Coalition, which
uses tactics similar to those used by tobacco companies to sow doubt that
smoking leads to lung cancer. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, SMOKE,
MIRRORS & HOT AIR: HOW EXXONMOBIL USES BIG TOBACCO’S TACTICS TO
MANUFACTURE UNCERTAINTY ON CLIMATE SCIENCE 9 (2007).
45
See ANTHONY LEISEROWITZ, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEV. REP.
2007/2008: PUBLIC PERCEPTION, OPINION, AND UNDERSTANDING OF CLIMATE
CHANGE – CURRENT PATTERNS, TRENDS, AND LIMITATIONS 7, 14–15 (2008),
available at http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports/global/hdr2007-2008/papers/
leiserowitz_anthony.pdf; see also Elke U. Weber, Experience-based and
Description-based Perceptions of Long-term Risk: Why Global Warming Does
Not Scare Us (Yet), 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 103, 103–04 (2006) (“The absence of
a visceral response on part of the public to the risks posed by global warming
may be responsible for the arguably less than optimal allocation of personal and
collective resources to deal with this issue.”).
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so, then why do they negotiate with each other—fellow believers,
presumably—rather than try to change the public perceptions of
climate change? If not, then why would they bother with the
elaborate charade of appearing to try to negotiate an international
solution? With respect to national leaders and international
negotiators, either they believe it or they don’t, but if the problem
is the public psychology and perception of climate change, the
current path of negotiations is not a sensible response.
None of the above explanations for the failure to reach
agreement on an international solution pays attention to the
strategic interactions among countries as individual players.
Undoubtedly, there are political economy issues, transaction cost
issues, and issues of political will tied to psychological obstacles to
recognizing the danger from climate change. But in the end, the
problem that seems to animate international climate negotiations
most is the problem of one country waiting to see what another
country will do, because what countries do profoundly affects the
decision environment for other countries. Climate change is a
collective action problem writ large; only in a cooperative outcome
in which costly mitigation is undertaken is cooperating even
remotely rational. Without reassurances from other countries of
cooperation, it is extremely difficult to undertake a cooperative
course of action.
In the vernacular of international relations theory, this article
takes a realist approach to explaining climate negotiations,
working from very simple assumptions that countries are selfinterested and rational.46 This is not to deny that alternative
intellectual approaches would have much to say about climate
negotiations, especially in examining the complexities of domestic
politics and how they affect international negotiations. However,
the question addressed by this Article is fundamentally a realist
46
Realism in international relations theory assumes that states are selfinterested rational actors and will pursue national interests. By contrast, a
number of rival theories have challenged the simplicity of realism, including a
“constructivist” school that has sought to focus on non-state actors that influence
global events and international politics, and a “neoliberal institutionalist” school
that focuses on the role of institutions as facilitators of relations among states.
For a review of the major theories in international law and international relations,
see Peter J. Katzenstein, Robert O. Keohane & Stephen D. Krasner, International
Organization and the Study of World Politics, 52 INT’L ORG. 645 (1998); Harold
Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599
(1997).
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one: why are states seemingly behaving irrationally, and not
pursuing their national self-interests? Doubtless many theories
could provide some explanation, but in light of the
interdependencies that seem to animate international climate
negotiations, this Article seeks to provide a realist explanation for
what appears to be anomalous behavior.
This Article draws upon economic game theory, modeling
state actors as individual players. Game-theoretic models of
climate strategies have previously been developed to model
international climate negotiations. In Environment and Statecraft,
Scott Barrett sets out some principles of a theory on what would
make for successful international agreement to reduce greenhouse
gases.47 Drawing extensively on game theory, Barrett concludes
that the way to solve the twin problems of participation and
enforcement that have plagued Kyoto is first to agree to research
and development funding to lower the costs of greenhouse gas
reduction, and second to agree to technological standards—
command-and-control regulation—of greenhouse gas reduction so
as to create network incentives for adoption.48 Joining the
agreement would be, like the adoption of Microsoft Windows, an
economic necessity. Barrett has, in his subsequent work, further
developed his theory on technological development as the subject
of a treaty, showing that promoting some technologies as part of a
treaty may, under certain circumstances, induce greater
cooperation.49 This would be true if there existed a technology
that could produce positive network externalities, where adoption
brings its own benefits—again, not unlike adopting something like
Microsoft Windows. What is still missing from the economic
literature, however, is a simple model that can accommodate a
broad range of strategic behaviors of countries in climate
negotiations.
Other game-theoretic models of climate negotiations have
been incorporated into sophisticated economic models that devote
many lines of code to simulating the optimal path of greenhouse
gas mitigation for different countries over long periods of time.50
47

BARRETT, supra note 10.
BARRETT, supra note 10, at 393–96.
49
Scott Barrett, Climate Treaties and Backstop Technologies 19 (CESifo,
Working Paper No. 3003, 2010); see also Scott Barrett, Kyoto and Beyond:
Alternative Approaches to Global Warming, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 22, 25 (2005).
50
These include the model in Nordhaus & Yang, supra note 10, and the
48
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These models typically divide the world into a handful of regions
consisting of one or more countries—the United States and China
are usually “regions” all by themselves51—and model the optimal
amount of greenhouse gas abatement over time horizons of fifty to
one hundred years. The World Induced Technical Change Hybrid
model, or the WITCH model,52 developed by researchers at the
environmental economic research organization Fondazione Eni
Enrico Mattei, incorporates a game-theoretic component into an
integrated assessment model (a complex model that integrates
economic activity and climate feedbacks).53 WITCH divides the
world into twelve regions and models their behavior over a period
of one hundred years, in five-year increments. The game-theoretic
component, however, only involves game-theoretic decisions at
two stages: a stage in which formations of coalitions are made
among regions agreeing to reduce emissions, and a second stage in
which an optimal emissions level is chosen by coalitions (countries
acting in concert) and countries that did not join a coalition in the
first stage.54
While these models delve deeply into economic forecasting,
they do not test different game-theoretic assumptions and explore
how outcomes might change as assumptions change. These
WITCH model, discussed infra note 52.
51
See, e.g., Nordhaus & Yang, supra note 10, at 743 (William Nordhaus’s
early RICE model (Regional Integrated Model of Climate and the Economy)
divided the world into ten regions: the U.S., China, the E.U., Japan, the former
Soviet Union republics, India, Brazil, and Indonesia, i.e. 11 large countries, 38
medium-sized countries, and 137 small countries). See also WITCH model,
infra note 52.
52
The WITCH model (World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model) was
developed by a number of Italian researchers. It divides the world into twelve
regions: the U.S., China, Western E.U. countries, Eastern E.U. countries, Japan
and Korea, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America, Middle East and North
Africa, Africa, Non-E.U. Eastern European countries, and Australia and New
Zealand. WITCH builds in a number of features previously not a part of
integrated assessment models, such as endogenous models of technological
change. See WITCH MODEL DESCRIPTION, http://www.witchmodel.org/pag/
model html (last visited Nov. 15, 2010); see also Valentina Bosetti et al.,
International Climate Coalitions: A Game-Theoretic Analysis Using the WITCH
Model (Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei, Working Paper No. 325, 2009), available
at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1336&context=feem.
53
Integrated assessment models link climate change effects and economic
activity and effects in a joint climate and economic model to project climate
changes and economic costs and benefits together. For a review of some
integrated assessment models, see STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 145–52.
54
Bosetti et al., supra note 52, at 7.
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models are heavy on the economic analytics, but light on the
simpler game-theoretic interactions among countries that are
frustrating progress towards negotiated solutions to the climate
change problem.
This article proposes a simple dynamic game-theoretic model,
with a view towards perturbing a number of assumptions in the
model to see how outcomes might be affected. The complexity of
the climate change problem is such that no single model can
capture all of the strategic behaviors in play in international
climate negotiations. What seems more useful is a simple model
to highlight the most prevalent and important behaviors, and
suggest some non-obvious policy directions.
II. GAME-THEORETIC MODELING CHALLENGES
IN THE CLIMATE CHANGE CONTEXT
A model of international climate negotiations must address a
number of issues specific to the climate change problem, or at least
be explicit about its assumptions regarding these issues. In broad
brush strokes, some of the idiosyncratic features of the climate
change problem are as follows:
1. The public good nature of greenhouse gas reductions.
Being a global phenomenon, the greenhouse effect provides a
uniquely clear example of a public goods problem. Pure public
goods are non-excludable in provision (once the good is provided
to one it is necessarily provided to all) and non-rival in
consumption (the enjoyment of one person of the good does not
detract from the enjoyment by another).55
Reductions of
greenhouse gas emissions are perfectly non-excludable and nonrival. The reduction of emissions by one emitter or one country
unavoidably inures to the benefit of everyone in the world (in the
form of avoided risk and damages from climate change).
Similarly, “consumption” of this benefit is necessarily enjoyed by
everyone. As compared to many pollution and natural resource
problems, the climate change problem provides a perfect example
of a public good.
2. Free-rider effects of mitigation. A consequence of the
public good nature of greenhouse gas emissions reduction is the
strong potential for free-riding. Free-riding may take the form of
55

CHARLES D. KOLSTAD, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS 95–99 (2d ed. 2011).
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avoiding costly mitigation while allowing others to undertake it,
and it may also take the form of avoiding the costs of research and
development of new technologies that reduce greenhouse gas
emissions.
A particularly troublesome aspect of the free-riding problem
is that the greater the amount of mitigation undertaken by a
country (or group of countries), the greater the incentives for freeriding. Countries that reduce emissions will almost certainly be
reducing fossil fuel consumption, which reduces the global price of
fossil fuels, which in turn encourages developing countries to
increase the use of fossil fuels, canceling out, to some extent, the
emissions reductions achieved by developed countries, probably at
great economic and political cost.
The implication of the free-riding problem is that action to
reduce emissions may need to be universal or near-universal. As
the Stern Review points out, no country or even group of countries
can solve the climate change problem alone; coordinated action is
absolutely necessary.56 Countries thus find themselves in the
position of knowing that their participation in an agreement to
mitigate greenhouse gas emissions is a necessary, but far from
sufficient, condition to the consummation of an effective
international agreement to reduce emissions. This is a major
distinction between the climate change problem and the problem
of ozone-depleting chemicals, in which a smaller number of
countries with dominant firms were able to kick-start a broad
phase-out of ozone-depleting chemicals.57
Aggravating the free-riding problem is a political reality: if
one country waits to mitigate, other countries will pay for that
delay. If China continues to build coal-fired power plants, the
costs of retiring them in the future will not, as a practical matter,
be borne by China alone. Because such large greenhouse gas
emitters as the U.S. and China hold the fate of the world in their
hands, it is unlikely that their initial reluctance to act will be fully
punished by other countries. Put more clearly in a multilateral
context, if either China or the U.S. is initially recalcitrant, the
domestic politics of both countries are such that it is unlikely that
56

Mitigation will require action from developed and developing countries.
See, e.g., STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 205–06.
57
For a discussion of international dealings with respect to the problem of
ozone depletion, see RICHARD ELLIOTT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY (1998).
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such recalcitrance will be fully punished by the rest of the world.
In effect, the late-mitigating countries would be free-riding on the
efforts of early-mitigating countries to develop technologies and
processes that reduce emissions.
3. Uncertainty regarding damages and adaptation costs.
Despite a tremendous worldwide research effort, and despite the
efforts of the Nobel prize-winning Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change, scientific uncertainty continues to pose problems
with predictions. It is still not clear which effects will occur,
where they will occur, when they will occur, and how serious they
will be when and if they occur. At bottom, it is still difficult to
relate concentrations of greenhouse gases to specific global
temperature changes. The effects and formation of clouds, for
example, is poorly understood.58 Whether a near-catastrophic
“burp” of methane previously locked up in Arctic boreal forests
will occur, and how much of a temperature change that would
induce, is unknown.59 Even for what one would think to be a
relatively straightforward projection, such as the extent of sea level
rise, predictions are complicated by numerous uncertainties
regarding the extent of ice melt that would pour massive quantities
of fresh water into the oceans, the degree and nature of thermal
expansion that would exacerbate sea level rises, and the extent to
which carbon absorption by oceans would ameliorate warming
effects.60
All of this uncertainty makes it difficult for present-day
national governments to understand the future impacts of climate
change, let alone communicate the risk to its citizenries and plan
for their futures. And yet, if a country adopts a formal or de facto
cost-benefit approach for deciding whether or not to undertake
greenhouse gas emissions mitigation, this piece of information
would seem to be indispensable. Rational policy becomes difficult
to formulate, and more difficult to justify to an electorate.
One consequence of this uncertainty may be that as
58
See, e.g., Rong Zhang, Sarah M. Kang & Isaac M. Held, Sensitivity of
Climate Change Induced by the Weakening of the Atlantic Meridional
Overturning Circulation to Cloud Feedback, 23 J. CLIMATE 378 (2010);
GODDARD INSTITUTE FOR SPACE STUDIES, SCIENCE BRIEFS - CLOUDS AND
CLIMATE CHANGE: THE THICK AND THIN OF IT (2000), available at
http://www.giss.nasa.gov/research/briefs/delgenio_03/.
59
HENSON, supra note 16, at 86.
60
Id. at 109–18.
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information changes, a country’s perception of its vulnerability to
climate change may change. This is especially true in light of
recent studies that have shown a considerable gap in understanding
between climate scientists and the general public.61 Disconcerting
as it may be, a game-theoretic analysis will need to at least account
for the possibility that a country’s perception of its climate change
damages may change over time.
4. Discounting. Even more so than many environmental and
natural resource problems, the burdens of mitigation and the
benefits of avoiding climate change are separated in time. While
some of the effects of climate change are already being felt, the
most serious effects are likely to occur in the very long term, fifty
to two hundred years from now,62 making cost-benefit analyses
extremely sensitive to the discount rate (or rates) utilized. The
complicated nature of this issue and the enormous economic
implications have deeply divided economists. Most notably, Sir
Nicholas Stern, who was commissioned by the U.K. government to
perform a cost-benefit analysis of action to avoid climate change,63
and Yale economist William Nordhaus, a leading developer of
integrated assessment models, have disagreed sharply about the
appropriate discount rate. The discount rate is a critical difference
in the ways that the two prominent economists have analyzed the
climate change problem and reached dramatically different
conclusions.64 The division has made for unusually entertaining
theater for academics.65
Discounting as a purely economic concept is controversial
enough; asking the additional question in a descriptive political
61

See LEISEROWITZ, supra note 45, at 18–20.
See, e.g., HENSON, supra note 16, at 15 (“If emissions continue to rise
unabated through this century, the Greenland and/or West Antarctica ice sheets
could be thrown into an unstoppable melting cycle that would raise sea levels by
more than 7 m (23 ft) each. This process would take some time to unfold –
probably a few centuries, although nobody can pin it down at this point . . . .”).
63
STERN REVIEW, supra note 1.
64
A number of issues divide the two economists, but the issue of the
appropriate discount rate seems to generate the most controversy. For a review
of these disagreements, see Daniel H. Cole, The Stern Review and Its Critics:
Implications for the Theory and Practice of Cost-Benefit Analysis, 48 NAT.
RESOURCES J. 53, 60–78 (2008).
65
Nordhaus has written that the Stern Review was essentially “political in
nature and has advocacy as its purpose.” William D. Nordhaus, A Review of the
Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change, 45 J. ECON. LITERATURE
686, 688 (2007).
62
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context makes matters even more complicated. Almost anything
that is decided in the climate change context, including the
decision to do nothing, presents inter-generational tradeoffs. For
purposes of developing a game-theoretic model, a discount rate
must reflect not so much a normative judgment, but a positive
description of countries’ political behavior with respect to climate
change. That is, how much will politicians discount the welfare of
future generations, beyond what a purely economic analysis would
call for? Even if this challenging question is not wrestled down to
a conclusion, the sensitivity of payoffs to assumptions regarding
the discount rate must be taken into account.
A final consideration is that delayed action, allowing
concentrations to go higher before more drastic cuts are
undertaken, poses risks of some irreversible ecological damages
that are often overlooked.66 It is also possible that certain
irreversibilities in climate may take place while we are taking the
time to study the problem. Irreversibility is the flipside of
discounting, working in the opposite prescriptive direction. As a
descriptive modeling matter, the model proposed in this Article
does not explicitly assume that countries, in balancing costs and
benefits of greenhouse gas mitigation, take account of
irreversibilities.
5. The savings in mitigation costs of early mitigation. The
less that is done in the near term to reduce emissions and begin the
transition into lower-carbon economies, the more expensive it will
be in the long run, in nominal terms, to do the same things.
Despite their disagreements on discounting, Nicholas Stern and
William Nordhaus both recommend gradually intensifying
abatement effort over time to mirror the increasing social cost of
greenhouse gas emissions.67 Delaying action is very costly; once
emissions rise to certain levels, the emissions cuts to lower
greenhouse gas concentrations to manageable levels become
extremely costly.68 Again, these conclusions are sensitive to the
66
See, e.g., STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 72 (ocean acidification
irreversibly disrupting marine ecosystems), 80 (loss of species), 81 (irreversible
melting and collapse of ice sheets); see also Robert S. Pindyck, Irreversibilities
and the Timing of Environmental Policy, 22 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 233,
234 (2000).
67
STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 302; NORDHAUS, supra note 1, at 16.
68
STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 199 (“The rate of emissions cuts required
to meet a stabilization goal is very sensitive to both the timing of the peak in

HSU MACRO 3RD DOC

36

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

1/23/2012 1:10:47 AM

[Volume 19

discounting assumptions.
It is certainly possible that technological development could
lower future costs so that waiting is a rational strategy.69 It is also
true that the costs of carbon abatement are likely to fall over the
next twenty years.70 However, models of technological “learning”
rates generally do not assume large jumps in technological
innovation,71 perhaps because they rarely occur. Thus, unless the
discount rate is assumed to be very high, it becomes unlikely that
waiting and delaying is an economically efficient response to
climate change, as the decrease in costs is not likely to be as great
as the increase in cost of delayed action. Here again, though, the
free-riding problem figures prominently, as a country could
rationally wait and allow other countries to undertake the expense
of research and development of climate reduction technologies.
6. The role of technology. The rate of technological
innovation is a wild card that complicates economic modeling and
prescriptions for the optimal path of mitigation.
Current
developments of some technologies, such as carbon capture and
storage technology72 or biofuels,73 have not been particularly
encouraging.74 But at the same time, other technologies have
global emissions, and its height. Delaying action now means more drastic
emissions reductions over the coming decades.”), 211 (“Without early, wellplanned action, the costs of mitigating emissions will be greater.”).
69
Id, at 225–26.
70
Id. at 231.
71
Id. at 226 (“[E]stimates of learning rates from different technologies span a
wide range, from around 3 percent to over 35 percent cost reductions associated
with a doubling of output.”).
72
“Carbon capture” refers to the capture of carbon dioxide emitted as a result
of any combustion process, while the storage stage refers to the permanent
storage of the captured carbon dioxide, so that it does not enter the atmosphere
and contribute to climate change. See Howard Herzog & Dan Golomb, Carbon
Capture and Storage from Fossil Fuel Use, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA ENERGY 277
(2004).
73
Biofuels are gasoline substitutes that are derived from a variety of
agricultural crops, such as corn and sugar. Although biofuels are burned in an
internal combustion engine process like ordinary gasoline, the fact that biofuels
obtain their carbon from the normal carbon uptake process of vegetation creates
a net zero carbon dioxide emissions process. See generally Timothy Searchinger
et al., Use of U.S. Croplands for Biofuels Increases Greenhouse Gases Through
Emissions from Land-Use Changes, 319 SCIENCE 1238 (2008).
74
As recently as 2008, demonstration costs remained in the range of €60 to
€90 per ton of CO2 stored. This is approximately $88 to $131 per ton, using an
exchange rate of €1.4637 to $1, the average rate for 2008. BANK OF CANADA,
FIN. MARKETS DEP’T, YEAR AVERAGE OF EXCHANGE RATES (2008), available at
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emerged as surprising challengers to the worldwide fossil fuel
hegemony, such as concentrated solar power.75 Whether the world
sees more pleasant or unpleasant surprises may determine the fate
of climate change.
In addition to its role in reducing emissions, technology has
other, more complicated roles as well. How the world adapts to
climate change, technologically and otherwise, may profoundly
affect approaches to climate change.76 A country’s confidence in
its ability to adapt to climate change may dampen its enthusiasm
http://www.bank-banque-canada.ca/pdf/nraa08.pdf; MCKINSEY & CO., CARBON
CAPTURE AND STORAGE: ASSESSING THE ECONOMICS 6 (2008), available at
http://www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pdf/CCS_Assessing_the_Economic
s.pdf. This places them considerably far above many other emissions abatement
and reduction strategies. See MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON
ECONOMY 27 ex. 3.0.1 (2009) (showing that carbon capture and storage
strategies such as “Coal CCS new build,” “Iron and steel CCS new build,” “Coal
CCS retrofit,” and “Gas plant CCS retrofit” have higher marginal abatement
costs than other strategies). A more favorable report concludes that the cost of
capturing, transporting, and storing carbon is closer to $30 per ton of CO2.
MASS. INST. TECH., THE FUTURE OF COAL, at xi (2007), available at
http://web mit.edu/coal/The_Future_of_Coal.pdf.
However, other studies
suggest that the current estimates are still too low. See, e.g., Mohammed AlJuaied & Adam Whitmore, Realistic Costs of Carbon Capture 17 (John F.
Kennedy Sch. of Govt., Discussion Paper No. 2009-08, 2009) (estimating $100–
50 per ton). The McKinsey “Pathways” report also indicates that “2nd
generation biofuels” have a relatively high marginal abatement cost relative to
other strategies. MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY,
supra.
75
Concentrated solar energy is a form of solar energy that uses mirrors to
concentrate sunlight to generate heat to drive a turbine to generate electricity.
DEP’T
OF
ENERGY,
Concentrating
Solar
Power,
U.S.
http://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/printable_versions/csp_program.html
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2010). Production costs have dipped to such surprisingly low
levels—they could be as little as seven cents per kilowatt-hour—that
concentrated solar power has become as cheap as or cheaper than the more
conventional solar power from photovoltaics. Southwest Concentrating Solar
Power
1000-MW
Initiative,
NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.,
http://www.nrel.gov/csp/1000mw_initiative html (last visited Nov. 18, 2010);
see also Kevin Bullis, Cheap, Superefficient Solar, TECH. REV. (Nov. 9, 2006),
http://www.technologyreview.com/energy/17774/page1/ (reporting that the
technology could soon make solar power as cheap as electricity from the grid).
76
“Adaptation” is a general term used to describe all forms of adjustment to
a climate-changed world that societies undertake, both now and in the future.
For example, building sea walls is a way of adapting to higher sea levels, and has
been frequently discussed as a way of protecting New York City from sea level
rises.
See, e.g., Climate Change Initiatives, PLANYC 2030,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/plan/climate_citywide.shtml
(last
visited Nov. 18, 2010). For a general discussion of adaptation, see, HENSON,
supra note 16, at 299.

HSU MACRO 3RD DOC

38

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

1/23/2012 1:10:47 AM

[Volume 19

for undertaking costly (and, in light of the free-riding problem,
potentially useless) mitigation measures.77 Along similar lines,
“geo-engineering” measures to physically or chemically remove
greenhouse gases from the Earth’s atmosphere, after they have
already been released, can be speculative and risky, but offer
humankind the technologically appealing chance to undo past
mistakes.78 Both adaptation research and geo-engineering research
are controversial, in that they have the potential to detract from the
mitigation mission, and divert resources away from mitigation
efforts, even undermining international negotiations.
But
frustration at the pace and general ineffectiveness of international
negotiations has naturally spawned inquiries about alternative
ways to address climate change. Both adaptation and geoengineering also change the way that countries view damages.
Both may, if effective and if the costs were even remotely
ascertainable, serve as a “backstop” for climate damages, in much
the same way that the cost of alternative energy sources place an
upper bound on the amount of money that could reasonably be
spent on reducing emissions from coal combustion. As will be
shown later, both may also reduce the incentives for strategic
behavior.
7. Mitigation costs are minimized by coordinated early action.
Even apart from the free-riding problem, early mitigation by only
one country is more costly because it loses opportunities to
undertake early coordinated action to reduce emissions and
prepare a capital stock for transition into a less greenhouse gasintensive economy. There is no doubt that efforts to innovate to
reduce emissions that are undertaken globally will be more
effective than those undertaken by some smaller subset of
countries.
Research and development efforts funded and
supported by more governments and staffed by engineers and
77
A related argument has been made that mitigation and adaptation are
strategies that compete for finite funds, and that some adaptation measures are
potentially more cost-effective in saving lives. For a discussion of these
arguments, see INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE
CHANGE 2007: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION AND VULNERABILITY 754–56 (2007).
78
“Geo-engineering” is a general term used to describe a wide variety of
measures aimed at reducing the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases,
post-combustion or post-release, sometimes by directly removing greenhouse
gases from the atmosphere, or reducing the amount of solar radiation that reaches
the Earth. For a general discussion of geo-engineering, see HENSON, supra, note
16, at 330–32, and discussion infra in text accompanying notes 126–127.
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scientists from more countries stand a better chance of finding
breakthroughs than those of a smaller group of countries. Some
research and development efforts might benefit from economies of
scale in research and development. For example, carbon capture
and storage technology is not, at this time, considered a very costeffective emissions reduction measure.79 However, research
undertaken in which research costs are shared among several
countries offers the potential to achieve some research and
development economies of scale. Hence, the U.S., a country that
generates about half of its electricity from coal-fired power
plants,80 has entered into joint carbon capture development and
other research agreements with China,81 another country heavily
invested in coal combustion.82 Further, coordination in mitigation
efforts makes for larger and more competitive markets for
mitigation technologies. A recent global glut in the supply of solar
photovoltaic panels is not exactly a success story,83 but it
highlights the global nature of demand for solar photovoltaic
panels. This global market has only been made possible with some
joint action among a number of countries, including China, in
promoting the installation of solar photovoltaic panels. These and
other gains from coordination produce reductions in mitigation
costs. Conversely, a lack of coordination is more costly.
8. International climate negotiations and mitigation actions
take place over many time periods. Finite and infinite repeated
games are nothing new to game theory, but the complexity of
strategic interactions inherent in international climate negotiations
poses tractability challenges for the modeler. Casual models of
79
See MCKINSEY & CO., PATHWAYS TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY, supra
note 74.
80
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY NOVEMBER 2010,
at 15 tbl.1.1 (2010), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/
epm_sum html.
81
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, U.S.-China Clean Energy
Announcements (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.energy.gov/news2009/
8292 htm) (also announcing “partnerships” with China in developing other
technologies and strategies).
82
China
Overview/Data,
U.S.
ENERGY
INFO.
ADMIN.,
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/China/Coal.html (last visited Dec. 4, 2010)
(“Coal makes up 71 percent of China’s total primary energy consumption, and
China is both the largest consumer and producer of coal in the world.”).
83
Therese Poletti, Solar Industry Seeing a Big Glut, MARKET WATCH (Aug.
13, 2009), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/solar-panel-glut-may-lead-tomore-price-implosion-2009-08-13.
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climate negotiations are reduced to a simple, static prisoner’s
dilemma problem,84 which captures the collective action problem
but not the intertemporal effects of actions.85 Most importantly in
modeling climate negotiations, there is no acknowledgement
inherent in the prisoner’s dilemma that a cooperative outcome
could be reached if parties are permitted to signal an intent to
cooperate to each other. Serendipitously, the nature of the global
climate change problem is such that a communication of that sort,
which could consist of a costly commitment to reduce emissions,
could also have the effect of lowering future mitigation costs for
everybody. An early mitigation measure would thus serve the dual
purpose of lowering future mitigation costs, and transmitting a
signal about intent to mitigate in the future. Above all, this earlystage action of commitment is what is most effective in recruiting
participation into multilateral or bilateral negotiations.
9. International climate change negotiations defy traditional
game-theoretic labels. The complexity of international climate
negotiations is such that it is difficult to characterize using labels
traditionally relied upon by game theoreticians to determine model
structure. While computational limitations in modeling usually
constrain many-player games to static games, the complexity of
climate change requires that it be modeled as a dynamic process.
Information asymmetries suggest that perhaps climate
negotiations should be modeled as a dynamic game of incomplete
information,86 and perhaps that a signaling model be used to model
relationships between potentially cooperating countries.87 After
all, it has been said often in the course of international climate
negotiations that there is a tremendous amount of mutual mistrust
among negotiating parties.88 A mutual suspicion and pessimism as
84

See, e.g., SANDLER, supra note 9, at 224.
For an example of a model that does consider intertemporal effects, see
Shi-Ling Hsu, What IS a Tragedy of the Commons? Overfishing and the
Campaign Spending Problem, 69 ALB. L. REV. 75 (2005) (modeling the tragedy
of the commons as an extensive-form game).
86
A leading treatise on applied game theory is by Robert Gibbons. ROBERT
GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMISTS 173–232 (1992) (discussing
dynamic games of incomplete information).
87
For a description of signaling models, see id. at 183–209.
88
Peter Baker, Poorer Nations Reject a Target on Emission Cut, N.Y. TIMES,
July 9, 2009, at A1 (““They’re saying, ‘We just don’t trust you guys,’” said
Alden Meyer, of the Union of Concerned Scientists. “It’s the same gridlock we
had last year when Bush was president.””).
85
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to the ability of the other to navigate its respective domestic
political landscapes to enact meaningful greenhouse gas emissions
regulation is one source of mistrust. If that were the animating
feature of climate negotiations, then a signaling model might be
appropriate.
In such a model, countries would have the
opportunity to signal to each other that they are of a particular
type—the mitigating type—and this would reassure other countries
that early mitigation would be met with reciprocal mitigation, not
free-riding. However, models of information asymmetry require
substantial simplification of payoff structures, such that the costs
and benefits of strategic climate choices cannot be adequately
represented in a pure signaling game. This Article takes the
approach of firstly modeling negotiations as a process with perfect
information, and then relaxing that assumption to see what effect
signaling has on the potential outcomes. This is done in Part
V.A.1.
III. A PROPOSED MODEL
This Article proposes to begin with a simple model. The
model is a two-player, three-period game of perfect information:
two periods in which the players elect to undertake or not
undertake mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gases, and a
third in which the countries will suffer damages from climate
change if mitigation efforts in the first two periods are
unsuccessful. The players move simultaneously in period one and
again in period two, and the costs of mitigation in period two
depend upon how much mitigation is undertaken in period one.
The proposed model begins with the assumption of perfect
information. This is not a realistic assumption; as far as public
policy and international relations is concerned, the problem of
climate change is host to an unprecedented collection of
uncertainties—scientific uncertainties about the effects of climate
change and the timelines of those effects, uncertainty with respect
to damages from climate change, uncertainty over how nations will
react to climate change, uncertainty over the internal political
dynamics of climate change in every country, and a host of other
unknowns. However, attempting to incorporate these uncertainties
at the outset of a modeling exercise is bound to end in failure. The
approach taken in this Article is to begin with an assumption of
perfect information, and to relax that assumption so as to see how
outcomes change. This approach loses some resolution, and loses
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the ability to model interrelationships among some uncertainties,
but still offers the possibility of some qualitative analysis. With
the heated (for academics) debate among Stern and Nordhaus and
others over just one parameter—the discount rate—seeming to
play itself without resolution, it seems unproductive to attempt to
nail down precise relationships in quantitative terms. The raw
state of climate policy would benefit from a simpler analysis.
A. The Parties
The two players in this model are labeled as the U.S. and
China. There are several reasons for this. First, they are the two
largest greenhouse gas-emitting countries, together representing
over 40 percent of the world’s current annual carbon dioxide
emissions.89 Both of these two countries are absolutely essential to
a meaningful attempt to curb emissions. Both countries have
expressed a fear of jeopardizing economic growth and risking the
loss of economic and industrial competitiveness that would
supposedly accompany greenhouse gas reduction efforts.90 They
are two countries that are central to the debate over what to do
about climate change.
Second, the U.S. and China aptly represent the divide between
the developed world and the developing world in their greenhouse
gas emissions profile, their economic ambitions, and their ideas on
89

In 2008, the entire world emitted a total of 29,381 megatons of carbon
dioxide. China emitted 6,550 megatons of carbon dioxide, and the U.S. emitted
5,595.92 megatons, accounting for a total of 41.3 percent. INT’L ENERGY
AGENCY, 2010 KEY WORLD ENERGY STATISTICS 48, 56 (2010), available at
http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2010/key_stats_2010.pdf.
90
See, e.g., GOP: US Should Reject Climate Pact, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 12,
2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2010488118_apclimaterepu
blicans html; PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA, NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N,
CHINA’S NATIONAL CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME 19 (2007), available at
http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File188.pdf
(“The
development history and trend of various countries has revealed the obvious
positive correlations between per capita CO2 emissions, per capita commercial
energy consumption and the economic development level. In other words, with
current level of technology development, to reach the development level of the
industrialized countries, it is inevitable that per capita energy consumption and
CO2 emissions will reach a fairly high level. In the development history of
human beings, there is no precedent where a high per capita GDP is achieved
with low per capita energy consumption.”); cf. Jonathan B. Wiener, Climate
Change Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1805, 1817 n.38
(2008) (describing China’s focus on resolving tensions between economic
growth and factors such as pollution).
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wealth redistribution. The U.S., like most developed countries, is
primarily interested in obtaining universal agreement on countryspecific limits on greenhouse gas emissions and setting them to
some historical baseline;91 China, like most developing countries,
is interested in linking greenhouse gas reduction with global
wealth redistribution, setting emissions rights on a per capita basis,
and/or linking responsibilities with historical emissions.92 So, as
the two players in this game, the U.S. and China serve as proxies
for developed and developing countries, the two most important
groups of interests that have clashed in the international climate
context.
Finally, the U.S. and China have, in fact, at times held
discussions as if they were the only two countries that needed to
reach agreement on greenhouse gas emissions reductions.
Certainly, they are the most important two, and an argument can
be made that the U.S. and China could make a bilateral
arrangement and then use their combined economic, political, and
91
The U.S. proposal at the Copenhagen meetings was to reduce its emissions
by 2020 to 17 percent below its 2005 levels, highlighting a dispute with
Europeans that have insisted on maintaining 1990 as the baseline year as the
Kyoto Protocol has done. See Press Release, The White House, President to
Attend Copenhagen Climate Talks: Administration Announces U.S. Emission
Target
for
Copenhagen
(Nov.
25,
2009),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/president-attend-copenhagenclimate-talks (discussing the U.S. proposal to reduce emissions in 2020 to 17
percent below 2005 levels). For a discussion of how the U.S. proposal conflicts
with the European Union proposal, see Malcolm Dowden, Posting to LexisNexis
Communities Environmental Law and Climate Change Community (Nov. 30,
2009,
3:19
PM),
http://www.lexisnexis.com/community/environmentalclimatechangelaw/blogs/topstories/archive/2009/11/30/copenhagen_3a00_-the_1820_base-year_1920_-debate.aspx; see also Todd Stern, Special Envoy for
Climate Change, Press Briefing at the United States Mission (Dec. 15, 2009)
(transcript available at http://geneva.usmission.gov/2009/12/15/climate-changedec15/).
92
PEOPLE’S REP. OF CHINA, NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N, supra note 90,
at 2 (“As noted by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (hereinafter referred to as UNFCCC), the largest share of historical and
current global emissions of greenhouse gases has originated from developed
countries, while per capita emissions in developing countries are still relatively
low and the share of global emissions originating from developing countries will
grow to meet their social and development needs. The UNFCCC stipulates
clearly that the Parties to the Convention shall protect the climate system for the
benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity
and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and
respective capabilities, and accordingly, the developed country Parties shall take
the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.”).
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military clout to coerce the rest of the world into falling in line.
Such a bilateral-first approach would at least have the advantage of
avoiding the cumbersome (and heretofore ineffective)
multinational process implicit in the UNFCCC. At least, a
cooperative outcome between the U.S. and China would be an
important first step towards achieving multilateral agreement on
emissions reductions. Agreement between the U.S. and China
could be the foundation on which a multilateral agreement is built
from the ground up.93
B. Modeling Mitigation Costs and Damages
This model is an attempt to simulate the consequences of
current and near-future actions based on projections of future costs
and benefits. The model consists of three time periods.
 In the first period, the countries simultaneously decide
whether to undertake Early Mitigation, or “EM”, to reduce
greenhouse gases. Relating this to real-life policy (but not
in the proposed model), EM corresponds to current or nearterm mitigation policies, those undertaken within the next
five years.
 In the second period, the countries simultaneously decide
whether or not to undertake Late Mitigation, or “LM”, to
reduce greenhouse gases. In the real-life world, LM
corresponds to longer-term mitigation policies, those
undertaken in ten to forty years.
 In the third period, countries will suffer very long-term
damages from climate change if mitigation measures are
unsuccessful. The very long-term corresponds to events
taking place more than forty years from now.
This model builds in highly stylized numbers to represent
non-discounted mitigation costs. For EM, mitigation costs in
period one are assumed arbitrarily to be 1 for each country
undertaking them. EM by just one country is assumed to be
equally effective no matter which country undertakes it, and is
assumed to benefit both countries.94 Non-discounted mitigation
costs in period two are again, for illustrative purposes, chosen
93

This idea has, as far as the author is aware, only been suggested in a novel
by Matthew Glass. MATTHEW GLASS, ULTIMATUM 49–51 (2009).
94
This is consistent with the model’s treatment of free-riding discussed infra
in Part IV(c).

HSU MACRO 3RD DOC

2011]

1/23/2012 1:10:47 AM

GAME THEORY AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS

45

somewhat arbitrarily to be multiples of period one mitigation
costs:
a) 2 if both countries mitigated in period one,
b) 4 if only one country mitigated in period one, and
c) 6 if neither country mitigated in period one.
This mitigation cost structure is meant to reflect the modeling
challenges discussed above that pertain to: (1) how early actions
affect later mitigation costs and (2) how coordination of action
affects mitigation costs. Consistent with economic projections,
non-discounted LM costs are assumed to be lowest when both
countries undertake EM, higher when only one country undertakes
EM, and highest when neither country undertakes EM. Again, the
intuition behind these assumptions is simple: the less that is done
in the near term to reduce emissions and convert economies into
lower-carbon economies, the more expensive it will be to do so in
the long term. And, for the reasons discussed above, if either
country fails to undertake EM, then LM costs will be greater, for
both countries.
It is worth emphasizing again that these mitigation costs are
represented by highly stylized numbers. I have assumed that
mitigation costs can be modeled using the simplest set of numbers
to highlight some non-obvious results. And again, it is worth
emphasizing that discounting may change the payoffs, such that a)
is not necessarily better than b), which is not necessarily better
than c), which is not even necessarily better than a climatechanged world. Again, the objective of this modeling exercise is
to produce a descriptive account of the strategic dynamics of
international climate negotiations, not a normative case for early
mitigation.
C. Free-riding
This model makes the critical assumption that both countries
must undertake LM in order for the world to avoid climate change
(without geo-engineering). If either country fails to undertake LM,
all mitigation measures in either period will have been futile, and
both countries will have to absorb the full costs of a climatechanged world. This strong assumption is derived from warnings
from the Stern Review that, as discussed above, countries are
unlikely to be able to successfully mitigate the effects of climate
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change alone.95 In essence, this model assumes that as between the
two players, any free-riding in the second (LM) period would
defeat efforts to avoid climate change.
Game-theoretic models to date illustrate the powerful effect of
free-riding. William Nordhaus’s RICE model (Regional Integrated
Model of Climate and the Economy)96 and the WITCH model
(World Induced Technical Change Hybrid model),97 the two main
economic game-theoretic models of climate negotiations, both
conclude that free-riding is of central importance. In the WITCH
model, free-riding plays an almost determinative role in whether
countries can successfully cooperate to achieve an optimal
mitigation path. Bosetti et al. find that in cases of substantial nonparticipation, leading to substantial leakage of fossil fuel
combustion, the costs of mitigation for those countries mitigating
become astronomically high—as much as $2000 per ton of CO2.98
This price is a reflection of the difficulty faced by a mitigating
country trying not only to curb its own emissions, but also to
compensate for the fact that other non-mitigating countries are
busily undoing all of the emissions reductions achieved by
mitigation.
Both the Nordhaus and WITCH models involve large
numbers of players—twelve “regions” of the world each
comprising countries with similar economic and emissions
profiles—such that cooperation is extremely difficult to achieve.
And because both of these models assume that there can be no
incentives to join a cooperating coalition of regions (such as trade
sanctions against non-joiners), the only incentives to cooperate
consist of the slightly better chance of avoiding climate change, an
increment that is minimized by free-riding. Moreover, the WITCH
model assumes that free-riding behavior would be non-orthogonal
to mitigation measures; because mitigation measures are likely to
reduce the global price of fossil fuels, the model builds in an
assumption that the greater the mitigation, the greater the freeriding.99 It should surprise no one that the prospects of
cooperation to avoid climate change are bleak under these models.

95
96
97
98
99

See STERN REVIEW, supra note 1, at 450–65.
Nordhaus & Yang, supra, note 10.
See supra note 52.
Bosetti et al., supra note 52, at 27.
Id. at 9–14.
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The simplifying assumption in the model proposed in this
article that free-riding would absolutely preclude cooperation and
avoidance of climate change is meant to make free-riding
exogenous and sidestep modeling it. This is not to deny that as a
descriptive matter, free-riding is endogenous and increases with
mitigation efforts. But the purpose of this model is to isolate
certain factors that might advance cooperation, even in the face of
potential free-riding.
A second reason for exogenizing the free-riding problem is
that no matter how daunting the problem, each country must still
make decisions on greenhouse gas mitigation that serve its own
population, and to some extent exogenize considerations of what
other countries are doing. To repeat for emphasis a condition
stated above, in order for there to be cooperation, every country
will have to accept that their cooperation is a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition to avoiding the most severe climate change
effects. Given sufficient exigency, countries must make that
probabilistic determination without the luxury of resenting the
possibility that others will defect; given the stakes, countries must
eventually put aside questions of fairness and make a decision that
maximizes their own welfare, even if it results in the unjust
enrichment of others.
D. Discounting
Future payoffs are discounted in this model. Each country has
a specific discount rate. A number of considerations are packed
into the discount rate in this model. In addition to the purely
economic sense in which a discount rate operates, this model
assumes that a country-specific discount rate also embodies a
preference for delay because of the possibility of technological
learning that reduces future mitigation costs, as well as future
adaptation costs. WITCH and other integrated assessment models
separate out technological learning as a factor that affects the
timing of mitigation decisions. This model wraps technological
learning into the discount rate, as in rough terms, the effect would
be the same: to make delayed action more economically attractive
than near-term action.
As noted above, modeling political actors such as climate
negotiators requires the utilization of not just a traditional
economic discount rate, but a political one—the rate at which
decisionmakers discount future costs and benefits while making
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present decisions. Apart from the purely economic reasons to
discount, it would be naïve to think that climate negotiators would
weight the welfare of future citizens of their country as highly as
they weight those of their current constituents. In fact, it seems
adventurous to assume that political actors with electoral pressures
make decisions that are as generous to future generations as an
economic discount rate would have it. In other words, a discount
rate used to model political decisions by governments would, as a
descriptive matter, probably be higher than a purely economic one.
This model assumes a country-specific discount rate only over
the three time periods in the model, and not, like the WITCH
model or other integrated assessment models, over fifty to one
hundred years and in small increments. Second period mitigation
costs are discounted at its country-specific rate, and third period
damages are doubly discounted. The discount rate in this model is
thus not meant to represent a discount rate that is expressed in
annual terms, as discount rates often are. In the model,
discounting is expressed as discount factors, such that a discount
factor x is expressed as (1-r)n where r is the discount rate and n is
the number of years. For simplicity, the three periods are assumed
to be spaced evenly apart, so that n is assumed the same between
periods one and two as it is between periods two and three. r is
assumed to be constant. Discounting payoffs in period two is thus
accomplished by multiplying by x; discounting payoffs in period
three is accomplished by multiplying by x2.
E.

Damages from Climate Change

In this model, damages from climate change are depicted as A
for the U.S. and B for China. Each country perceives its own
damages, and that these perceived costs could change over time, as
they seem to have in recent years in both the U.S. and China.
Country-specific damages from climate change are of course
highly uncertain. And obviously, it is not just the very long term
in which many projected climate change impacts will be
manifest.100 But the most serious impacts occur in this long time

100
An extensive federal interagency review of the impacts of climate change
has concluded that the impacts of global climate change are already being felt in
the U.S. U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, GLOBAL CLIMATE
CHANGE IMPACTS IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (2009), available at
http://downloads.globalchange.gov/usimpacts/pdfs/climate-impacts-report.pdf.
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frame, and this model best captures the nature of the intertemporal
tradeoffs by separating out time periods for mitigation, which
occur in periods one and two, and for damages, which occur in
period three.
The simplest conception of climate change damages imagines
them as those costs that are incurred as a direct or indirect result of
the effects of climate change. They may include, for example,
rescue and relief efforts incurred from more severe tropical storms
(over and above those that would have occurred anyway), damages
to the agricultural sector from regional shortages of water due to
climate change, and damages to cities that find themselves, in a
climate-changed world, below sea level.
More ambitious
conceptions of climate change should take into account the
likelihood that positive feedback effects may amplify and/or
accelerate the effects of climate change.101 The possibility that the
dangers of climate change have been underestimated because the
small climate changes already caused will beget other greenhouse
gas releases, and further climate change, is alarming but as of yet
hard to evaluate. Should A or B (U.S. and China damages,
respectively) include the expected value of the possibility of
positive feedback and catastrophic effects? They might well not,
given the very uncertain projections surrounding the possibility of
catastrophic effects. But Weitzman’s warning about the costbenefit analyses that either ignore or falsely purport to account for
catastrophic outcomes suggests substantial caution is warranted.102
Obviously, a huge range of potential effects are possible, and there
are no doubt a number of currently unforeseen effects that would
add to the costs. For now, a simple model is proposed and a set of
unique solutions derived.
F.

Finally, the Model

Given the modeling assumptions described above, the model,
a game of perfect information, is set out in extensive form in
Figure 1 below. The players move simultaneously in period one
and in period two. The payoffs of the U.S. and China are derived
from the sum of the mitigation costs (set out in Part IV.B. above)
and damages from climate change, if it occurs. These are observed
in period one, so period two payoffs are discounted (multiplied by
101
102

See generally Torn & Harte, supra note 13.
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
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corresponding to different permutations of whether the countries
undertake EM or not. Second, subgames A, B, and C have only
one stable Nash equilibrium,103 and subgame D has two, so that
there are only five possible outcomes:
1. Both U.S. and China do EM and both do LM.
2. U.S. does EM, but China does not, then both do LM.
3. China does EM, but U.S. does not, then both do LM.
4. Neither U.S. nor China does EM, but both do LM.
5. Neither U.S. nor China does EM or LM, and climate
change occurs.
This winnowing-down of outcomes is possible because first,
no Nash equilibrium could involve just one party doing LM.
Under perfect information, each player would know in advance
whether the other was going to do LM. Since both players must do
LM in order to prevent climate change, there is no point in one
country undertaking LM if it knows the other will not. Second,
either player doing EM implies a cooperative Nash equilibrium,
because under perfect information the parties would know in
advance whether cooperation was possible; if it was impossible,
then neither party would bother with EM. Hence, subgames A, B,
and C, in which at least one player undertakes EM, have a unique
cooperative Nash equilibrium, and subgame D in which neither
player undertakes EM has two possible Nash equilibria: a
cooperative Nash equilibrium and a non-cooperative outcome
resulting in climate change.
It is illustrative to consider subgame D and observe the
conditions under which doing EM would appear to be inefficient
and also when non-cooperation (and suffering damages from
climate change) is efficient. First, consider the possibility that
both the U.S. and China would prefer to avoid climate change
damages (perceive a very high A and B, respectively), but both
have a high enough discount rate that they prefer only LM (have a
low x and y respectively). Taking a look at the payoffs for the U.S.
(the Chinese analysis would obviously be identical), this would
mean that the U.S. prefers the payoff of outcome 4 to outcome 2
and outcome 5 (outcomes 1 and 3 are not possible because China
103

In its simplest form, a Nash equilibrium is an outcome whereby each
player in a game pursues a strategy that is the best strategy given every other
player’s best strategy. It is an equilibrium, because there is no incentive for any
player to deviate from his strategy. GIBBONS, supra note 86, at 8.
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will not do EM):
-6x > -1-4x and -6x > -Ax2
or, in other words:
x < ½ and Ax > 6104
So if Ax > 6 and By > 6, but also x < 1/4 and y < 1/4, and
if both countries believe these conditions to hold, then a
cooperative Nash equilibrium would be one in which both the U.S.
and China eschew EM, but both do LM—the result of both
countries being sufficiently concerned about the damages of
climate change, but also both countries having high discount rates.
The differences between outcomes 1 through 4, all of which
end in cooperation, also illustrate one important role of the twostage mitigation process. Why not combine EM and LM?
Separating out EM from LM in two separate periods is important
for a number of reasons, but foremost among them is the
illustration of how different parameters for different countries may
alter the allocation of the burden of mitigation across countries or
across time. Also, the most interesting results from the model are
derived when the perfect information assumption is relaxed (Part
IV.A), and period one actions and inactions explicitly affect the
decision environment for period two.
A unique solution thus exists for each set of values of A, B, x
and y.105 Conceptually, cooperative Nash equilibria occur for
higher values of Ax or By or both, and higher values of discount
factors x and y or both. The outcomes of this simple game are
mapped in Figure 2. The conditions are formally derived in
Appendix A.
Boundary conditions are omitted, so only
inequalities are analyzed. It seems sufficient for illustrative
purposes to assume that cooperative Nash equilibria are unstable
unless the conditions are strictly satisfied.

104
Again, the 6 is just an arbitrarily chosen mitigation cost for LM with
neither party doing EM. To put numbers to this exercise, if x=1/6, then -6x = -1.
Recall that the payoff of the U.S. doing both LM and EM (assuming that China
also does EM and LM) is -1-2x, so the U.S. payoff is -1-2/6 = -4/3. Recall that
the payoff of U.S. doing LM but not EM (assuming that China does the same) is
-6x, so the U.S. payoff is -1. Assuming China does the same as the U.S., the
U.S. has a higher payoff only doing LM.
105
An exception to this exists in the form of an unstable cooperative Nash
equilibrium. The exception involves low discount factors (high discount rates),
and illustrates a classic prisoners’ dilemma in that a socially optimal cooperation
is foiled by individually optimal self-interest. This is derived in Appendix A.
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IV. Modifying the Game-Theoretic Model
It is important to keep in mind the purpose of modeling
behavior under an assumption of perfect information. It is not as if
there is suspense in stage 2; the point of modeling is to illustrate
how differences in parameter values—in this game the perceptions
of damages and the discount rates—affect the distribution of costs
and the sequence of moves by each player. The model under
perfect information simply illustrates the relationships between
pieces of information.
That said, if this article ended here, the reader would be
justified in complaining that the proposed model explains little,
especially given the somewhat arbitrary choices of mitigation
costs. The model is useful, however, as a baseline for showing
what happens to the probability of a cooperative outcome once the
assumptions are relaxed. That is, what this model can illustrate
about international climate negotiations can be gleaned by
perturbing various aspects of the model and seeing what happens
to the likelihood of a cooperative outcome. What follows is a
series of modeling perturbations, with accompanying lessons about
climate negotiations.
A. Imperfect Information: Uncertainty and Strategic Behavior
As acknowledged earlier, the greatest leap of this model is the
assumption of perfect information. Much of the difficulty and
shenanigans swirling about the climate change public policy
problem can be traced to the fact that many pieces of information
are uncertain—scientific, economic, and political. In the first part
of this Part, the perfect information assumption is relaxed and the
effect of uncertainty is explored. As well, uncertainty in all its
forms gives rise to the possibility of strategic behavior, which is
discussed in a second subpart to this Part.
Uncertainty negatively affects prospects for a cooperative
outcome. The reason for this is that cooperation in this model is a
joint product. Given that this model adopts a cost-benefit decision
framework, and given that mitigating greenhouse gases is only
rational if others mitigate, it is not only important to understand
one’s own costs and benefits, it is vitally important to understand
the costs and benefits of other countries. If one country perceives
that another country’s cost-benefit analysis would disfavor
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mitigation, then it would have reason to believe that cooperation is
doomed; under those circumstances, it would be irrational to
mitigate. Uncertainty can have a devastating effect on the
prospects for cooperation.
1.

Uncertainty

There are a variety of ways that uncertainty can wreak havoc
in climate policymaking and international relations. For example,
scientific uncertainty inherent in climate change seems to have
produced psychological responses that challenge assumptions of
rationality. Psychologists and enlightened economists have long
understood that people make poor decisions under uncertainty.
When faced with the task of weighing certain information against
uncertain information, people systemically overweigh the certain
information.106 Thus, when faced with a choice of certain
mitigation costs and uncertain damages from climate change,
humans will be inclined to bias towards the former. In a sense, the
manipulation of public opinion by those opposed to climate change
is merely a scaling-up of a human propensity to make, on an
individual level, mistakes in judgment that involve uncertain
information. In the context of this game, which naively assumes a
simple cost-benefit calculation, scientific uncertainty clearly biases
decisions against mitigation, and towards delay.
These
uncertainties also exacerbate the collective action problems of
negotiating climate agreements.107
Uncertainty also raises the possibility that parties could signal
future intentions to each other, since imperfect information renders
future actions probabilistic.
The mitigation cost structures
assumed by the model under perfect information already build in a
considerable amount of information about potential future paths.
The fact that LM costs more, the less EM is undertaken, means
that failure by either player or both players to undertake EM
creates a world in which a cooperative outcome can occur in a
narrower set of possible combinations of values of A, B, x, and y.
This does, in fact, reflect what most economists will say about
106

See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of
Decisions Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 263 (1979); see also Amos
Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974) (discussing the effects of various heuristics
when making judgments in the face of uncertainty).
107
See SANDLER, supra note 9, at 224.
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EM: a little bit now could save a lot later; so much so that doing
nothing now forecloses a number of future options.108
But even apart from the hard path-dependencies created as
part of the structure of the game, undertaking EM must also, in the
real world of international relations, mean something else: it must
signal a turn, political or social, representing a commitment to
some different path. EM in this real world, then, has more than
just an economic consequence for the future; it has the effect of
irrevocably committing some resources to mitigating greenhouse
gas emissions, and signaling the possibility of reciprocity should
another party make a similar or greater commitment. Of course,
political decisions can be undone and social movements can
reverse themselves. But the nature of a costly and necessarily
long-term commitment to reduce greenhouse gas emissions means
that there will be political costs should a future administration
renege on these commitments.109 This is important information to
other interested countries.
For example, consider China’s rapid deployment of coal-fired
power plants.110 Because it is so costly to retire these plants, this
current emphasis on coal-fired electricity production has very
significant long-term implications. The U.S. could be forgiven for
doubting that China would undertake any future mitigation in the
form of reducing electricity-related greenhouse gas emissions.
There are, of course, a number of other things that China could do
twenty to forty years from now that might amount to late
mitigation, but it is hard to avoid interpreting such a breakneck
pace of construction of coal-fired power plants as a prioritization
of economic development over climate concerns.
As for the United States, consider the wavering prospects of
climate law—federal and state legislation, as well as the occasional
dramatic development in climate litigation—and consider how
these twists and turns affect the decision environments of any
country considering greenhouse gas mitigation. Supporters have
108

See supra notes 67–71 and accompanying text.
For an economic game-theoretic model of the costs of breaking
commitments to reduce greenhouse gases, and how these affect international
negotiations, see Ana Espinola-Arredondo, Free-Riding and Cooperation in
Environmental Games, 11 J. PUBL. ECON. THEORY 119 (2009).
110
As of 2007, China was adding coal-fired power plants capacity each year
that was comparable to the entire grid supply of the United Kingdom. MASS.
INST. TECH., supra note 74, at ix.
109
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emphasized what it would mean to the international community if
the U.S. Congress passed anything that commits to greenhouse gas
reductions. Of course, legislation and even case law can be
undone by future administrations and courts. But every case and
every piece of legislation creates its own expectations, and
therefore creates its own stickiness. This would have been
particularly true of the American Clean Energy and Security Act of
2009 (the Waxman-Markey Bill) that passed the House of
Representatives, had it become law. In financing the political
support needed to make an expensive transition to a lower-carbon
economy, the authors of the bill have doled out considerable
benefits to a variety of industries. After an unprecedented
lobbying effort,111 the bill’s cap-and-trade program wound up
including a stream of free emissions allowances worth an
estimated $378 billion (in present value terms) to a Christmas list
of powerful industries.112 Many have been critical of the rents that
have been distributed in closed-door negotiating sessions, as well
as the bill’s scaled-down ambitions.113 It is worth keeping in mind,
however, that if the bill ultimately became law, it would be
difficult for the United States to retreat in the future, especially
given the vested industry interests that would have been the
beneficiary of Representatives Waxman and Markey’s generosity.
This would be an important signal to the rest of the world.
Under uncertainty, then, actions in period one play important
dual Bayesian roles. First, they provide information about how a
country perceives its damages from climate change and/or its
discount rate (as conceived in this game). Second, the path
dependencies created by political decisions to commit resources
(and the social currents that underlie these decisions) to mitigating
greenhouse gas emissions are such that there is at least some
political and economic permanence attached to these course
111

It was reported that 1,150 groups lobbied the U.S. Congress in just the
twelve weeks leading up to passage of Waxman-Markey. Timothy Gardner,
Lobbyists Elbow for Influence on U.S. Climate Bill, REUTERS.COM, Aug. 12,
2009,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/08/12/us-climate-lobbyingidUSTRE57B61Y20090812.
112
For one of many analyses of the Waxman-Markey bill and the political
concessions that were made in order to obtain passage, see Hsu, supra note 35.
113
See, e.g., James Hansen, G-8 Failure Reflects U.S. Failure on Climate
POST
(July
9,
2009,
10:33
AM),
Change,
HUFFINGTON
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dr-james-hansen/g-8-failure-reflects-usf_b_228597 html.
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changes. Both of these types of information may, in a gametheoretic setting, affect the willingness of other countries to
undertake LM.
There is a further significance and importance to uncertainty
and signaling that is not easily captured by a game-theoretic
model. The model in this article only involves two game-playing
stages—an improvement over earlier static depictions—but what if
there were many stages, with many pieces of information being
generated at each stage? This is in reality what is happening on
the world stage, as administrations change, as climate science
develops, and as the discourse and information about climate
change evolves.
The discouraging or encouraging effects of early behavior
such as EM may have a positive feedback effect that amplifies the
signaling that might be modeled in this game. Consider again, for
example, if the United States interprets Chinese construction of
coal-fired power plants in a very negative way: that China must
view its risks from climate change to be quite manageable, and is
therefore dubious about mitigating greenhouse gases. In a multistage game, a subsequent stage could involve some action (or
reaction) by the United States that similarly could be interpreted by
China as retreating from any commitments to mitigate greenhouse
gas emissions—for example, political developments that signal a
lower likelihood of passage of federal climate legislation. Given
the volatile political relationship between the United States and
China, this could be a very realistic signal from the United States
that it, too, is inclined to take its chances with climate change,
especially if Chinese reluctance to mitigate would render
American action unilateral and therefore futile. What would then
be a Chinese response? Seeing U.S. hostility and dimming
prospects for a cooperative outcome on mitigating greenhouse gas
emissions, it may decide that further retrenchment and further
savings are in order. And so on. What a simple two-stage game
fails to capture is the possibility of a dynamic unraveling of
prospects for cooperation. Some action that could be perceived as
a negative signal could provoke something that could reasonably
be perceived as a negative reaction from the other, which would,
because of the need for cooperation, induce further retreats. This
dynamic has been on display often in international climate
negotiations. Discussions on implementation of the Copenhagen
Accord have faltered amid cross-accusations of a lack of
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commitment to climate policy; U.S. negotiators fault other
countries for backtracking on commitments made in Copenhagen,
while other countries point to the failure of the United States
Senate to pass legislation for casting a pall over negotiations.114
Conversely, positive action on greenhouse gas mitigation
could build on itself. In addition to its investment in coal-fired
power plants, China has also invested heavily in renewable energy
technologies, aiming to become a leader in technological
development in these industries.115 This action seems all the more
credible as a signal in light of China’s actions to insulate these
nascent industries from international competition.116 Besides
being a strategic industrial threat, a U.S. interpretation could also
view this as a Chinese expectation that energy generation in the
future will be low-carbon. Even if this does not explicitly signal
current Chinese willingness to reduce greenhouse gas emissions,
its investment in a lower-carbon future is a sign that China
anticipates such a future. That could be a signal of future Chinese
acquiescence, since a lower-carbon future would be impossible
without Chinese acceptance. That in turn could prompt American
optimism, and perhaps usher along domestic greenhouse gas
legislation that promotes U.S. renewable energy research, which
would further signal to China a U.S. preparation for a lowercarbon future. And so on.
Uncertainty, and the signaling it necessitates, thus carries with
it heightened consequences. In an environment of uncertainty with
respect to the science, politics, and economics of climate change,
even actions that would otherwise be viewed as inconsequential
could play important informational roles. With so much at stake
and so much uncertainty, the worldwide yearning for information
would naturally lead to a situation in which a seemingly
disproportionate amount of attention is paid to so many minor
events. Uncertainty about climate change means that knowledge
about climate change and knowledge about what different
114

Friedman, supra note 37.
Lisa Friedman, China Leads Major Countries with $34.6 Billion Invested
Mar.
25,
2010,
in
Clean
Technology,
CLIMATEWIRE,
http://www.eenews net/features/documents/2010/03/25/document_cw_03.pdf
(citing THE PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, WHO’S WINNING THE CLEAN ENERGY
RACE? (2010)).
116
Keith Bradsher, Drawing Critics, China Seeks to Dominate in Renewable
Energy, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 2009, at B1.
115
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countries think about climate change is evolving. A multi-stage
game illustrates the role of early actions as part of that evolution of
climate information. One should not be surprised that in such a
setting, little things could mean a lot.
2.

Strategic Behavior

Perhaps even more troubling, scientific uncertainty allows
posturing to take place within domestic and international debates
over allocations of burden-sharing. Economic uncertainty invites
highly interested parties to produce their own numbers with their
own opaque assumptions, clouding an already confusing public
discussion. Political uncertainties constrain or appear to constrain
policymakers and negotiators.
The strategic behavior problem discussed in this part
illustrates some of the pitfalls of the way that climate negotiations
have been conducted thus far. In the international realm, a
somewhat disingenuous discussion about the “justice” of the
climate change problem has helped enable domestic and
international posturing that has masked common interest and
threatened the stability of international and domestic negotiations.
There is certainly an appeal to the argument that developed
countries that have benefitted from the combustion of fossil fuels
(and therefore mostly created the problem of climate change)
should assume a higher burden in reducing greenhouse gases. The
fact that the Kyoto Protocol set out obligations for developed
countries but not developing countries117 might reflect this
understanding. Most would probably also agree that developed
countries should also make what amounts to side payments to
developing countries to assist in their economic development in a
lower-carbon future, and to assist in adaptation to the effects of
climate change.118 Were strategic behavior absent from this
117

See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 20.
As part of the recent Copenhagen climate negotiations, developed
countries pledged to donate $100 billion per year by 2020 to begin assisting
developing countries. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Conference of Parties, Fifteenth Session, Copenhagen, Dec. 7-18, 2009,
¶ 8, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/11/Add.1 (Mar. 30, 2010). While the Clean
Development Mechanism has come under intense criticism for its
ineffectiveness, as noted supra in text accompanying note 42, the notion that
development assistance is warranted has remained intact. Critics of the Clean
Development Mechanism propose alternative means of financing, rather than
abandonment of the idea of making side payments to developing countries. See,
118
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process, there would be no overall welfare implications—side
payments would merely be converting potential Pareto Superior
moves into Pareto Superior moves. However, only heroic naïveté
would entertain such a notion.
Strategic behavior as modeled in this article also pervades
domestic negotiations in crafting domestic legislation. Regulating
greenhouse gases and transitioning whole economies into a lowercarbon mode manifestly creates winners and losers. In both
domestic and international climate negotiations, side payments will
clearly be necessary and widespread in order to obtain sufficient
agreement on mitigating greenhouse gases. This Article, however,
will confine itself to the modeling of side payments in the
international realm. In modeling the effects of strategic behavior
and the resulting potential for mischief, this model provides a
conceptual linkage between the justice discourse119 and the
consequentialist discourse120 that have grappled for supremacy in
the climate change debate.
This model introduces the possibility of side payments by
allowing side payments to be made in period one, to induce EM
e.g., Wara & Victor, supra note 42, at 6. China has acted as a spokesnation for
developing nations. For example, China emphasizes the principle that developed
countries should take the lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. PEOPLE’S
REP. OF CHINA, NAT’L DEV. & REFORM COMM’N, supra note 90, at 58
(“According to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ of
the UNFCCC, the Parties included in Annex I to the Convention should take the
lead in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. For developing countries with less
historical emission and current low per capita emission, their priority is to
achieve sustainable development.”); see also Copenhagen Climate Talks
(UNFCCC), N.Y. TIMES, http://topics nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/sub
jects/u/united_nations_framework_convention_on_climate_change/index html
(last visited Dec. 18, 2009) (“The Chinese continue to resist mandatory ceilings
on their emissions. They argue that the developed countries have churned out
greenhouse gases for decades and should bear a greater burden in reducing them.
Developing nations, they add, should not be restrained in using economic
development to raise their standards of living, even if greater emissions result.”).
119
For one synthesis of the many, many works on climate justice, see Sonja
Klinsky & Hadi Dowlatabadi, Conceptualizations of Justice in Climate Policy, 9
CLIMATE POL’Y 88 (2009). Domestically, the fairness within countries of certain
policy measures has featured prominently in the instrument choice literature. For
one of several economic analyses of the distributional impacts of different
greenhouse gas regulatory instruments, see Dallas Burtraw, Richard Sweeney &
Margaret Walls, The Incidence of U.S. Climate Policy (Sept. 17, 2009)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.rff.org/documents/RFF-DP09-17.pdf.
120
See, e.g., BARRETT, supra note 10; STEWART & WIENER, supra note 23;
Wiener, supra note 90.
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and LM, or period two to induce LM only. The simpler case is a
side payment in period two to induce the other party to undertake
LM. Consider, for example, the following possible scenario: the
U.S. perceives its damages from climate change to be very high,
and is willing to undertake LM, but China perceives its damages to
be low enough that it is only willing to undertake LM in certain
period two subgames. Suppose that
Ax > 6 and x > 1/2 and
2 < By < 4 and y < 1/2
Given these assumption, the players will enter period 2 in
subgame B (if x < 1/2, the parties would enter subgame D, and
the analysis would be similar). In subgame B, the parties would
both undertake LM (and a cooperative Nash equilibrium is
reached) if both the U.S. and China have higher payoffs from LM
than from facing climate change, i.e. if both of the following are
true:
-1-4x > -1-Ax2 and -4y > -By2
which reduces to the pair of conditions
Ax > 4 and (1a)
By > 4 (1b)
But we have assumed that By > 4, so we know that subgame
B would ordinarily end with no cooperation. However, the U.S.
can make a side payment in the amount of s to China so that LM
becomes worth it. Adding a side payment s into a comparison of
payoffs in subgame B for the U.S. and China yields
-1-4x-s > -1-Ax2 and -4y+s > -By2
which (dividing through by –x and -y) means that
Ax  4 

s and (2a)
x

By  4 

s
y

(2b)

What this side payment has done is substitute conditions 2a
and 2b for conditions 1a and 1b, adding in the s/x and s/y terms
to create new conditions for a cooperative Nash equilibrium in
subgame B. If the side payment is conditioned upon China’s
undertaking LM, conditions 2a and 2b represent the new test for
whether cooperation will occur. So if there is an s such that,
starting from the initial assumptions, conditions 2a and 2b can be
satisfied, then a side payment from the U.S. to China could rescue
what would otherwise be a doomed effort to cooperate to mitigate
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greenhouse gas emissions. The same analysis would apply if the
parties found themselves in subgame D, only the conditions would
be more stringent.121
A side payment could also be made in period one. In order
for a side payment to work in period one, however, two conditions
need to be satisfied, not just one. Not only must a side payment be
possible to induce LM by both parties, but the side payment must
induce the parties to enter a subgame in which LM is induced for
both parties. This slightly more complicated derivation is set out
in Appendix B. As long as there is perfect information regarding
all of the parameters, there is no reason that a side payment could
not convert all potentially Pareto-efficient situations into Paretoefficient outcomes.
The trouble arises, of course, as it does in simple Coasean
bargaining situations, when there is imperfect information.
Damages or a country’s perception of its own damages may be
uncertain, as well as discount rates or a country’s perception of its
own discount rates. If, for example, the U.S. is not certain of B or
y (China’s climate change damages or its discount rate,
respectively), then failure by China to EM could be interpreted as
one of four possible things: (1) a signal that China believes its
climate change damages to be low; (2) a signal that China has a
high discount rate; (3) both (1) and (2); or (4) strategic behavior in
the form of a false signal in order to extract a period two side
payment. The trick for the country that wants to avoid climate
change (in this scenario, the U.S.) is to ascertain the real reason
why China eschews EM, and whether it would later undertake LM.
For the country that eschews EM (in this scenario China), it may
stand to gain a benefit in the form of a side payment, even if it
intended to undertake LM after all.
If China does undertake strategic behavior, however, it runs a
risk: instead of extracting a side payment from the U.S. in period
2, China’s failure to undertake EM in period 1 could cause the
U.S. to abandon hope of cooperation and simply refuse to
undertake LM in period 2. A number of misunderstandings could
lead to strategic behavior backfiring: China could overestimate A

121

The side payment would have to be made so that both the conditions
s and
s would be satisfied.
Ax  6 
By  6 
x
y
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and x, so that it expects a side payment from the U.S., when in
fact none would be forthcoming; the U.S. could underestimate B
and y, such that it does not believe it could afford a large enough
side payment to induce China to LM, when in fact it could; the
values and understandings of all of the parameters could change
over time, and failure to EM could have foreclosed options.
Because EM makes LM cheaper, strategic behavior that involves
not doing EM could put the parties into a subgame in which LM is
too expensive, while it might not have been too expensive in a
different subgame.
For example, it could also be the case that China assumes
that:
Ax > 4 and China knows that for itself By > 4,
but that it thinks it can finagle a side payment from the U.S..
But suppose, in reality:
4 > Ax > 2,
and if the U.S. undertook EM and China did not, then the
parties would be in subgame B, and the U.S. would not, as it
would have in subgame A, have undertaken LM. In subgame B,
Ax would have to be greater than 4 in order for it to be
worthwhile, but in subgame A it would only have to have been
greater than 2 to have been worthwhile. So by trying to extract a
side payment out of the U.S., China would have created an
unnecessarily stringent condition for cooperation, and induced an
outcome that would be inferior to the one that would have
occurred if China had not tried to deceive the U.S.
Whether China and developing nations are truly sincere about
their demands for side payments is obviously hard to know,
perhaps even for the Chinese and the developing nations
themselves. It could well be true that developing countries truly
view their climate-change damages as low, given that many of
them start from a current position of poverty, and climate-related
damages would not pose a huge loss of wealth as it might for
wealthy countries. For the most part, international institutions and
climate negotiations have acknowledged this dynamic, although
the degree to which efforts have met the needs of developing
countries is a subject of intense disagreement. The Clean
Development Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, which provides
for the issuance of emissions credits for developed countries
towards meeting their Kyoto targets if they fund an emissionreducing project in a developing country, was intended to transfer

HSU MACRO 3RD DOC

2011]

1/23/2012 1:10:47 AM

GAME THEORY AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS

65

wealth to developing countries. Its success at reducing greenhouse
gases and aiding those most in need, however, has been called into
question.122
The Copenhagen negotiations have picked up where previous
negotiations have left off. In the opinion of U.S. climate
negotiator Jonathan Pershing, a number of countries viewed the
Copenhagen summit not as a forum for climate change solutions,
but as a process for wealth redistribution.123 In this regard,
Copenhagen can not be considered a complete failure from these
countries’ perspectives: the U.S. announced a commitment at
Copenhagen to help raise $100 billion to assist developed
countries with adapting to climate change.124
Given this kind of uncertainty and a demonstrated propensity
to seek side payments, it becomes understandable why a country
might seek to delay mitigation. Uncertainty may explain some
current hesitation among developed countries to undertake
mitigation, as well as what in this game would be considered EM.
Uncertainty and the potential for mischief through strategic
behavior can be reduced by waiting until period two. It is true that
failing to undertake EM forecloses options, but looking at climate
negotiations as not just a two-stage game, but a more realistic
multi-stage game might soften the stark finality of certain
decisions. A country looking at a series of annual decisions over
many years might well trade the loss of options for some better
information. In a world where there are multiple opportunities to
undertake EM, the refusal to undertake EM this year may still be,
in the eyes of the uncertain beholder, worthwhile—if some
uncertainty can be reduced in the meantime.
Delay begins to make even more sense in the presence of
strategic behavior.
For example, assuming—again, without
asserting—that in the context of this model, the U.S. were the

122

For a discussion, see Wara & Victor, supra note 42.
U.S. Deputy Envoy for Climate Change Jonathan Pershing, Remarks at the
Center for Strategic and International Studies (Jan. 14, 2010) (transcript available
from E&ETV at http://www.eenews net/tv/transcript/1091) (“. . . Bolivia,
Venezuela, Nicaragua, Cuba. These are countries that are a part of the ALBA
group, a group that sees this process not so much as a solution to climate change,
but, in fact, as a mechanism to redistribute global wealth.”).
124
Lisa Friedman & Darren Samuelson, Hillary Clinton Pledges $100B for
Developing Countries, CLIMATEWIRE, Dec. 17, 2009, http://www.eenews net/
climatewire/2009/12/17/archive/1?terms=hillary+clinton.
123
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party more interested in avoiding climate change, it may seek to
delay mitigation to see whether China will undertake EM, and then
see if over time some of the uncertainty disappears, or if it can
evaluate the feasibility of a side payment under a smaller number
of conditions.
The possibility of side payments and the
introduction of information asymmetry as to whether a country is
truly unwilling to undertake mitigation without a side payment
presents a variety of problems. If a country believes it can take
advantage of an information asymmetry and extract a side
payment, it can create all kinds of mischief, and potentially harm
its own prospects—assuming the country is genuinely interested in
mitigating to avoid climate change.
B. Adaptation and Geo-engineering
“Adaptation” is the general term for a wide range of things
that can be done by a country to adjust to life in a climate-changed
world.125 Adaptation could include, for example, relocation of
populations so that an increased frequency of tropical storms
would no longer swamp the population and necessitate a costly
rescue and relief response, relocation of agriculture or the genetic
modification of seeds to yield more drought-resistant crops, or the
construction of sea walls to protect a city from the intruding sea.
“Geo-engineering” measures aim to reduce the atmospheric
concentration of greenhouse gases directly, without addressing the
sources of the greenhouse gases, thus solving the mitigation
problem by avoiding it entirely. Still in its early developmental
stages, proposed geo-engineering measures have included: the
promotion of ocean algal growth, which would capture carbon
dioxide from the atmosphere; the launching of tiny particle-sized
mirrors into the upper stratosphere so as to reflect sunlight and
prevent it from reaching the Earth; and the creation of synthetic
trees that are able to sequester greater amounts of carbon
dioxide.126 Much more innocuous geo-engineering measures
include the painting of roofs white, so as to reflect sunlight more
effectively and increase the amount of heat that is bounced off the
Earth’s surface and radiated back out into space.127 Obviously,
125

See supra note 76.
For a general discussion of geo-engineering, see HENSON, supra note 16,
at 330–32.
127
See Mark Henderson, Professor Steven Chu: Paint the World White to
126
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these and any future geo-engineering ideas will have their own
environmental consequences, which would need to be evaluated
and compared with the effects of climate change itself.
For better or for worse, adaptation and geo-engineering have
been, at various times and to various degrees, viewed as
alternatives to mitigation. These would have the advantage of
reducing the country’s reliance on others in coming up with a
strategy to address climate change. For countries with the
resources to do so, both adaptation and geo-engineering could
substitute in full or in part for efforts to reduce greenhouse gases.
Unsurprisingly, controversy has surrounded both adaptation
and geo-engineering. If it became clear that adaptation or geoengineering offered a less costly or less complicated option than
mitigation, then countries would likely divert resources away from
mitigation efforts and towards adaptation efforts. Similarly, geoengineering poses a threat of draining resources away from
mitigation. This is a bitter pill for environmental organizations to
swallow—the concession that environmental preservation may not
be the best strategy, and that money and attention may move away
from mitigation (i.e., preservation) efforts. Moreover, many
industrial interests, large and small, have become heavily invested
in a low-carbon future. From General Electric, one of the world’s
largest industrial conglomerates, which has invested heavily in
wind turbine technology, to Owl Power, a three-person Boylston,
Massachusetts-based company that converts cooking grease into
electricity for restaurants,128 many of the world’s industries have
already started to rebuild an economy predicated on mitigation as
the dominant response to climate change. These interests as well
would naturally view adaptation and geo-engineering skeptically.
After a period of initial controversy, objections to adaptation seem
to have abated, as it becomes clear that climate change is already
occurring,129 and especially when it is couched as aid to less
developed countries. Geo-engineering remains radioactive in

Fight Global Warming, TIMES (London), May 27, 2009, available at
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/environment/article6366639.ece.
128
See
About
Owl
Power
Company,
VEGAWATT,
http://www.vegawatt.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2010).
129
See, e.g., W. Neil Adger, Social Capital, Collective Action, and Adaptation
to Climate Change, 79 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 387, 387–88 n.1 (2003); David
Noble, Getting Started on Adaptation to Climate Change, 116 MUN. WORLD 5, 8
(2006).

HSU MACRO 3RD DOC

68

N.Y.U. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL

1/23/2012 1:10:47 AM

[Volume 19

many quarters.130
In the context of this article’s game, adaptation and geoengineering can be modeled as alternatives to mitigation, and
doing so yields some additional insights. The costs of adaptation
and geo-engineering, if they can be estimated, may serve as an
upper bound to the damages of climate change. This does require
the heroic (but illustrative) assumption that adaptation or geoengineering would be effective in placing a country’s future
population in as good a position as it would in a world without
climate change. But a country losing faith in the international
process for agreeing to mitigation measures may decide that other
approaches are worth investigation.
In this game, A and B can be viewed conceptually as not
just the damages from climate change, but the minimum of: (1) the
damages from climate change; (2) the costs of full adaptation; and
(3) the costs of effective geo-engineering. Of course, no
adaptation response or geo-engineering scheme can satisfy the
heroic assumption that they can provide a social welfare status that
is fully equivalent to the complete avoidance of climate change.
But a country could rationally ask itself whether it was cheaper to
find ways to mitigate (reduce the emission of greenhouse gases),
or to find ways to adapt to and live with the effects of climate
change, or to geo-engineer itself out of its current climate
predicament. And once a country had made such a determination,
it could begin to move resources to the best of the three strategies.
If conceptually, A or B is the minimum of: (1) damages from
climate change; (2) the costs of adaptation; or (3) the costs of geoengineering, then A and B could well be lower than originally
assumed in this model. A country would view its choices,
appropriately discounted, as (1) mitigation measures to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions; (2) adaptation measures; (3) geoengineering; and (4) doing nothing and suffering the damages from

130

See, e.g., Martin Bunzl, Researching Geoengineering: Should Not or
ENVTL.
RES.
LETTERS
(Oct.–Dec.
2009),
Could
Not?,
4
http://www.iop.org/EJ/article/1748-9326/4/4/045104/erl9_4_045104.html. But
see H. Damon Matthews & Ken Caldeira, Transient Climate – Carbon
Simulations of Planetary Geoengineering, 104 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 9949,
9949 (2007), available at http://www.pnas.org/content/104/24/9949.abstract (“It
is perhaps not surprising that there has been recent renewed interest in possible
top-down technological fixes of the climate/energy problem . . . .”).
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climate change.131 This introduces another threat to cooperation:
the possibility that some countries may start to think that
adaptation and geo-engineering are alternatives to cooperation.
Again, returning to an earlier theme, the hint that a country
might adapt or geo-engineer would send an alarming signal to
other countries. In a game where cooperation and interdependence
are the keys to mitigating climate change, the mere suggestion that
a country may be less enthusiastic about mitigation is enough to
encourage defection. In the arithmetic and vernacular of this
game, if a country were to flirt with adaptation or geo-engineering,
it might be indicating that its perception of its damages might be
lowered by one of these strategies, and that it might be more
difficult for another country to believe that Ax or By might be
large enough to sustain a cooperative Nash equilibrium. In
particular, adaptation costs, to the extent that they are incurred in
the future, would be discounted and might seem more attractive
than present-day mitigation measures. And to repeat a disclaimer
made earlier, this article takes as its starting point the proposition
that allowing climate change to advance unchecked is an
inefficient global assumption of risk, but this model could well
accommodate the conclusion that the most efficient outcome is a
non-cooperative one, particularly if adaptation or geo-engineering
measures can play a role in substituting for mitigation.
Adaptation and geo-engineering also threaten the prospect for
cooperation in mitigation in yet another way: they could induce a
search to lower adaptation or geo-engineering costs, thereby
further reducing the prospects for cooperation. So it could be that
if China engages in posturing before period 1 in order to induce a
side payment, the U.S. could eschew EM, and switch research
resources from mitigation to adaptation. In the process, the U.S.
could figure out how to lower its adaptation costs, and in turn truly
make itself and other countries inclined to avoid mitigation
altogether. Adaptation and geo-engineering can thus derail
international mitigation cooperation by channeling research and
development resources away from mitigation.
There is, however, for those hoping for cooperation, a positive
contribution to be made by adaptation and geo-engineering.
131

It would be hard to believe, however, that a country would not find at least
some adaptation measures worthwhile, and thus rule out doing absolutely
nothing.
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Adaptation and geo-engineering may play a role in facilitating
cooperation by curbing strategic behavior. The root of strategic
behavior is an imbalance in the ways that countries perceive their
own damages from climate change. If, under uncertainty, China is
prone to overestimate U.S. damages A and the prospects for an
American side payment, then an alternative to mitigation that
effectively caps A could serve to dampen such over-optimism. In
effect, adaptation and geo-engineering are, by creating alternative
avenues of reducing damages, objective ways of calling the bluff
of would-be strategically-behaving countries. Given the potential
for mischief caused by strategic behavior, this could be a very
important feature of adaptation and geo-engineering.
This
dynamic, while unappealing to those hoping for cooperation, may
explain some of the push especially for geo-engineering.
Given the difficulty of achieving cooperation for mitigation,
adaptation and geo-engineering would naturally earn the ire of
environmental organizations and internationalists still hoping for a
global pact. But since glaciers seem to be melting at a faster rate
than the rate at which international climate negotiations seem to be
proceeding, it is also natural for countries to entertain alternatives
to international agreement on mitigation. Adaptation and geoengineering become off-ramps for getting out of the collective
action problem, and freeing a country from obsessing over whether
other countries will cooperate in mitigation or free-ride.132
Adaptation and geo-engineering become ways of hedging and of
diversifying a country’s portfolio of responses to climate change.
C. Modeling More Than Two Players
The proposed game is composed of two players and
incorporates a very strong assumption about free-riding: any freeriding is fatal to cooperation. This strong assumption is consistent
with the results of the WITCH model, which finds that cooperating
coalitions must achieve near-universality of mitigation in order to
be effective.133 Certainly, WITCH confirmed that no possible
coalition can be effective in avoiding climate change if it lacks
132

Geo-engineering, to the extent that it could be effectively undertaken by a
single country, would clearly solve collective action problems, even as it
introduces other externalities, both positive (removing greenhouse gases from the
atmosphere) and negative (the negative side-effects of geo-engineering
measures).
133
Bosetti et al., supra note 52, at 27.
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either the U.S. or China.134 But expanding the model in this article
to simulate negotiations among many countries, not just two, is
still illustrative. It should be no surprise that even adding a third or
fourth player to a game in which success must be a joint product
drives the likelihood of successful cooperation down sharply.
Imagine Figure 2, the matrix of outcomes of the game under
perfect information, only in three dimensions, or four, or more. It
is not difficult to imagine that as the dimensions increase, the
chances of cooperation decrease, as the green box in the matrix
becomes the green cube in an even bigger cube, and so on.
To take a simple numerical example, even if one were
generously to assume that there was, say, a 75 percent chance that
each country would mitigate, needing just 5 countries to sign on
would reduce the joint product to a mere 10 percent. In light of
those odds, any individual country could be forgiven for lacking
the stomach even to undertake modest EM measures. Cooperation
is much more difficult to achieve in a multi-player game.
Expanding the game to multiple players also further amplifies
the importance of signaling. As discussed above in Part IV.A.1,
signaling not only plays an important role in conveying
information, but the importance of those signals are compounded
when we allow for more game-playing stages.
Because
cooperation is a joint product, any information that may indicate
one player is less likely to cooperate will in turn make it less
attractive for the other player to cooperate, and so on. And to the
extent that an ill-advised attempt to extract a side payment sends a
signal to the rest of the world about a country’s willingness to
mitigate, it creates a potential for defection to snowball.
With more players in the mix, it becomes apparent that a
signal becomes still more consequential. A signal in a game with
more players would reverberate and have a greater effect on more
decision environments. Negative signals in a multi-player game
would multiply the disruptive effect on cooperation in mitigation.
Again, applying the strong free-riding assumption of this model—
that any free-riding is fatal to cooperation—the probability of
cooperation is a joint product of the probability that every country
will find it in its interest to resist free-riding and cooperate. In
such an environment, a negative signal has the effect of changing
the decision environment for all of the other countries, lowering
134

Cf. id.
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the probabilities of cooperation for all of the other countries, which
in turn makes it even less likely that LM will seem to be a rational
course of action for any of the other countries.
For those that have been critical of the meekness of various
measures proposed thus far,135 this game holds some lessons. With
cooperation such a fragile proposition, and with even small signals
playing important roles in each country’s decision environment,
this game illustrates how important even small EM measures
might be in salvaging some prospects for future cooperation.
Cooperation in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions might
necessarily have to consist of a series of small steps.
D. Other Strategies to Enhance Cooperation
Almost everything that can be done to the model has the
effect of discouraging cooperation. But assuming (without
arguing) that as a normative matter this would be a bad outcome—
that adaptation and geo-engineering are red herrings and that
climate change is truly dangerous enough to warrant costly and
concerted efforts to avoid it—then countries would still be welladvised to try to cooperate, and to reach an international agreement
to reduce greenhouse gases. In addition to highlighting the pitfalls
facing mitigation, this model suggests some strategies that may
encourage cooperation in mitigation.
One recent phenomenon that has emerged in international
climate negotiations is shaming. Increasingly, a moral stigma has
attached to those countries perceived as interfering with an
international process to reduce emissions. In 2007, during
multilateral negotiations over a successor to the Kyoto Protocol, an
American objection to language inserted by China and India was
greeted with a now-famous response from the representative of
Papua New Guinea:
“I would ask the United States, we ask for your leadership . . .
[b]ut if for some reason you’re not willing to lead, leave it to the
rest of us . . . . Please get out of the way.”136
135
For example, on the weakness of pledges put on the table as part of the
Copenhagen summit, Alden Meyer of the Union of Concerned Scientists has this
to say: “The pledges put on the table to date do not put us on track to meet that
goal and will make it very difficult for us politically and technically beyond 2020
to meet that target.” John M. Broder, Most Countries Submit Emission
Reduction Targets by Deadline, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 2, 2010, at A10.
136
Andrew Revkin, Issuing a Bold Challenge to the U.S. Over Climate, N.Y.
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The ensuing thunder of applause embarrassed the United
States representative, Paula Dobriansky, into dropping her
objection. The New Guinea representative acknowledged that the
portrayal of the United States as the pariah in these negotiations
was orchestrated by China and India by introducing measures that
were known beforehand to be objectionable to the United States.137
Nevertheless, the effect of that famous incident has been to raise
the costs of countries seeking to scuttle international agreement on
emissions reduction. Recently, China and India themselves seem
to have become more sensitive to criticism for holding up climate
negotiations.138
What does moral stigma mean for countries reluctant to
mitigate? In this game, it can be added into the damages of
climate change. The model is straightforward in that the higher the
damages of climate change for a country, the more likely that
country will mitigate. If a group of countries are willing to punish
non-mitigators somehow—perhaps by opposing international
initiatives favoring the non-mitigators—then it is possible that
non-mitigation might be deterred. In the vernacular of this game,
countries can find geo-political ways of increasing A or B.
Instead of a mere moral stigma that is manifested as future
geo-political opposition, mitigating countries may opt to use
international trade, either as a carrot or a stick, to encourage
cooperation in mitigation. As a stick, trade measures such as
“border tax adjustments”139 that seek to levy a tax on imports (and
TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008, at F2 (Statement of Kevin Conrad, Representative from
Papua New Guinea).
137
Revkin, supra note 136.
138
For example, both countries have recently joined the Copenhagen Accord.
China has announced it will voluntarily reduce its carbon intensity by 40 to 45
percent by 2020, compared with 2005 levels. India will reduce its carbon
intensity by 20 to 25 percent by 2020, compared with 2005 levels, excluding its
agricultural sector. John M. Broder, Climate Goal is Supported by China and
India, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2010, at A9.
139
A border tax adjustment is a levy on imported goods that are meant to
equalize certain tax burdens. Under Article II of the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), only “direct taxes” that can be attributed to an
immutable characteristic of a traded good may be the subject of a border tax
adjustment. Sales taxes generally fall into this category. Taxes that can be less
easily calculated and attributed to a particular good would generally not be legal
under the GATT. For a fuller explanation and an analysis of the trade-legality of
border tax adjustments, see Joost Pauwelyn, U.S. Federal Climate Policy and
Competitiveness Concerns: the Limits and Options of International Trade Law
(Nicholas Inst. for Envtl. Policy Solutions, Working Paper No. 07-02, 2007),
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a subsidy on exports) when mitigating countries trade with nonmitigating countries may play a role in encouraging cooperation.
A prevalent domestic concern with regulating greenhouse gases
has been the effect on domestic industries, as they compete in the
international market with industries in countries that may not
regulate greenhouse gases. This is of particular concern with
industries that are energy-intensive, such as steel, cement,
aluminum, and basic chemicals.140 While the legality and
desirability of using trade sanctions to force non-cooperators into
cooperation has been debated and generally rejected,141 the abject
failure of countries to make any significant progress in reaching
international agreement might cause some to re-think this
approach. This is especially true because the common assumption
that border tax adjustments are GATT-illegal has, of late, been
analyzed with some greater care and questioned.142 It may be that
border tax adjustments would survive scrutiny by the World Trade
Organization after all. If so, they may represent an important tool
in bringing countries into an international agreement to cooperate
in mitigating greenhouse gas emissions. If nothing else, they could
provide political cover for leaders that have to face down domestic
industries that might oppose cooperation in mitigation.
A safer course would be to use trade measures as a carrot.
Despite being contrary to the letter of the GATT,143 free trade
zones, such as that created by the North American Free Trade
Agreement, have proliferated. Creating a “club good” by linking
trade liberalization among countries cooperating in mitigating to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions stands a stronger change of
available at http://www nicholas.duke.edu/institute/ internationaltradelaw.pdf.
140
See, e.g., TREVOR HOUSER ET AL., LEVELING THE CARBON PLAYING FIELD
42–46 (2008) (noting that of these carbon-intensive industries, aluminum and
cement face significant pressure from imports, which satisfy a relatively high
fraction of demand).
141
See, e.g., BARRETT, supra note 10, at 388–89 (criticizing the use of border
tax adjustments, and arguing that they would be hard to calculate and have never
been an effective means of enforcing international environmental obligations).
142
See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 139.
143
Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the so-called
“Most Favored Nation” clause, provides that “any advantage, favour, privilege or
immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating in or
destined for any other country shall be accorded immediately and
unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties.” General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 1,
Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, A-12, 55 U.N.T.S 194, 198.

HSU MACRO 3RD DOC

2011]

1/23/2012 1:10:47 AM

GAME THEORY AND CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS

75

surviving WTO scrutiny than a trade sanction. Although the
economic effects are similar, international trade law seems to view
such carrots as more benign than sticks, such as sanctions.144
Perhaps even less intrusively, countries might participate in
the effort to advance the science of climate change, and perhaps
even adaptation and geo-engineering. The psychological biasing
effect of uncertainty has tilted countries (and their human
policymakers and leaders) towards inaction. Participating in the
IPCC, which has a continuing role in reducing scientific
uncertainty, is necessary but not sufficient. However great the
pains that the IPCC has taken to present scientifically credible
evidence and findings, it has still been relentlessly attacked for the
inevitable missteps that occur given the magnitude of its
undertaking.145 Surveys suggest that the world public seems to
overestimate the uncertainty of the scientific conclusions of the
IPCC and other climate scientists.146 As noted above, many
industry groups have been funding efforts to emphasize the
uncertainty, if not to actively mislead the world public.147
Whatever the cause, the awarding of a Nobel Prize to the IPCC

144
Free trade agreements would arguably be inconsistent with the most
favored nations clause of the GATT except that, under certain conditions, they
are explicitly exempted. Article XXIV of the GATT defines a “free trade area”
as “a group of two or more customs territories in which the duties and other
restrictive regulations . . . are eliminated on substantially all the trade between
the constituent territories in products originating in such territories.” Special
Protocol Relating to Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade, Mar. 24, 1948, 62 Stat. 2013, 2015, 62 U.N.T.S 56, 62 (amending General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. 24 § 8(b), Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S 194).
145
Recently, the IPCC was criticized for a misstatement on the rapidity at
which Himalayan glaciers are melting. Lauren Morello, IPCC Admits Error on
Himalayan Glacier Warning, E&E NEWS PM, Jan. 20, 2010,
http://www.eenews net/eenewspm/2010/01/20/archive/3?terms=IPCC+admits+er
ror. The IPCC acknowledged that it erred in placing too much reliance upon a
1999 interview with an Indian glaciologist, in predicting that Himalayan glaciers
would melt by the year 2035. However, the IPCC emphasized that the overall
conclusion regarding accelerating melting in the Himalayas was unchanged by
the embarrassment and still consistent with current science. See IPCC Statement
on the Melting of Himalayan Glaciers (Jan. 20, 2010), available at
http://www.eenews net/features/documents/2010/01/20/document_pm_04.pdf.
146
Matthew C. Nisbet & Teresa Myers, Twenty Years of Public Opinion
About Global Warming, 71 Pub. Opinion Q. 444, 453 tbls.13 & 14 (2007)
(showing that people generally believe there is controversy and disagreement
among scientists about global warming).
147
See McCright & Dunlap, supra note 43, at 348.
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might be viewed as an attempt to shore up the IPCC’s international
standing and perhaps reduce the mistaken public impression that
the conclusions of the IPCC are less certain than they actually are.
In any case, broader and deeper research efforts into climate
science are unlikely to be money wasted, as these could shed light
on some extremely important and poorly understood questions we
have about our planet. But more importantly, better science can
improve the decision environment for climate policymakers.
Finally, another interesting path forward has been suggested
by a fiction writer; it can find some support from the lessons of
this game: a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and China—not
as proxies or representatives for others, but as the actual individual
countries—on a cooperative mitigation strategy. The novel
Ultimatum, by Matthew Glass, takes place in the future and begins
with a newly-elected U.S. president that is contemplating the
continuation of secret bilateral negotiations with China, essentially
as an end run around a failed Kyoto process. The reasoning, as put
forward by Glass, is that agreement between two superpowers
removes the holdout problems inherent in the Kyoto process and
removes the many distractions that have made international
agreement so intractable.148 Bilateral agreement is considerably
easier than multilateral agreement, and, once the U.S. and China
agree, then a powerful coalition of the two largest greenhouse gas
emitters and probably the two most powerful countries could use
its economic and political clout, including its two votes on the
United Nations Security Council, to induce other countries to
cooperate. If they could actually act in concert, the U.S. and China
could considerably raise the political and economic costs of nonmitigation. This would especially be true if the U.S.-China
coalition could count on the support of the European Union, which
has led mitigation efforts and efforts to reach international
agreement on mitigation. What the Glass idea does is break down
the intractable game of international climate negotiations into
smaller, more manageable parts that may be less vulnerable to
some of the game-theoretic dynamics modeled in this game, such
as strategic behavior.
Is this fanciful fiction or a creative (if Machiavellian) way
forward? Countries engaged in international politics do not
currently seem to have an appetite for such unilateralism,
148
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particularly given the questionable international legality of some
inevitable aspects of such an approach. But this could change if
damages from climate change begin to crystallize and show
themselves to be catastrophic risks. If the exigency of climate
change became sufficiently clear, and international climate
diplomacy continued to fail, trade law could well turn a blind eye
towards some heretofore questionable trade practices.
There are countless ways in which countries can change the
payoffs of other countries in their approach to climate change and
affect the prospects for cooperation in mitigation. What this
Article argues is that they are best understood not as moral urgings
or attempts to construct an international legal order that compels
adherence through an expression of common interests, but as
attempts to affect the decision environment for other countries.
The history of international climate diplomacy seems to indicate
that those who approach climate negotiations as an intellectual
battleground of ideas in which they expect to prevail will be sorely
disappointed.
CONCLUSION
Scott Barrett and others have already persuasively argued that
it was a mistake to use the Montreal Protocol’s phase-out of
ozone-depleting chemicals as a template for reducing greenhouse
gas emissions.149 But the way forward is not entirely clear, in light
of the efforts that have already been expended in pursuing a
multilateral agreement on reducing greenhouse gases, and in light
of the disappointing results thus far. This Article does not propose
a policy path, for an individual country or for the world
community of nations. Rather, of the countless ideas and
proposals that have already been raised, this Article attempts to
make some sense of some of them.
This Article began with an argument that a new theory of
international climate negotiations was needed and then set out to
provide one. In its very simple form, the theory described in this
Article describes the decision environment for each nation
considering mitigation measures to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions as consisting of four simple factors: (1) its perceived
damages from climate change; (2) its costs of mitigation; (3) the
149
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rate at which it discounts the welfare of future generations; and (4)
the prospect of other countries agreeing to mitigation
measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.
The simple cost-benefit framework is not meant to be a
normative prescription for national decisionmaking; Martin
Weitzman’s cautionary note about cost-benefit analysis as a
determinative decisionmaking tool is important to observe.
However, Weitzman’s warning notwithstanding, the model does
present a reasonable description of how politicians and
policymakers actually consider mitigation measures to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. Added to this simple model are a
number of factors unique to climate change which increase the
complexity but do not fundamentally change the decision
framework: scientific uncertainty and imperfect information with
respect to how a country perceives its damages from climate
change (which gives rise to strategic behavior and poses risks of
suboptimal failures to cooperate), the costs and likely effectiveness
of adaptation measures and geo-engineering measures (which
serve to limit a country’s perceived future damages from climate
change), and most importantly, the myriad of things that countries
can do to change the decision environment for other countries.
On the one hand, the game-theoretic model in this article
illustrates, perhaps even dramatizes, the powerful effect of even
the threat of defecting (not reducing greenhouse gas emissions).
The mere possibility that one country may refuse to mitigate
increases the chances that another country will refuse to mitigate,
which in turn increases the chances that still other countries will
refuse. Early actions to mitigate are thus important not only
because they reduce the future cost of late mitigation, but because
they create an environment where cooperation is made easier.
That free-riding is such a difficult problem and that agreement is a
joint product of almost every single major emitter in the world is
the primary cause of despair for those hoping for multilateral
agreement on reducing emissions.
On the other hand, the risks of just hunkering down and
preparing for a potentially much warmer world are frightening
enough for many countries that some will consider allowing
climate change to affect international relations in other ways. For
now, the only costs nations seem to be willing to impose upon
those perceived as blocking international agreement is a mild
moral stigma. In the future, nations may feel differently about
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linking a variety of international issues with the issue of climate
change. For example, if some nations continue to push for
international agreement on reducing emissions, it is hard to
imagine that they will rule out using international trade to
assemble coalitions and encourage cooperation, legal or not.
While the architects of international efforts to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions struggle to obtain agreement from most
of the 192 nations of the world, some perspective may be useful on
the myriad of things that are being done. Much international
discussion has centered upon how to get countries to agree, or at
least seem amenable to agreement. Obtaining buy-in from former
and current high-emitting recalcitrants such as the United States,
China, India, and others, from developing countries that seem to
hold the key to developed country participation, and from
environmentalists and scientists throughout the world, has seemed
to be a Sisyphean task. The goal of this article has been to cast
these actions and discussions in a game-theoretic light, and to
explain in part their motivations. As well, the winnowing of all of
the variables of climate change down to just fourdamages,
mitigation costs, discount rates, and the prospect of other
countries’ cooperationhelps policymakers and analysts keep
their eye on what it is that can change a country’s decision
environment.
The central insight of this Article is that countries’ decision
environments are highly interdependent. The interdependency of
climate decisions is what has been missing from previous analyses
of international climate negotiations. What this Article does is
model these interdependencies. Rolling all of them into one model
would make the model intractable; the contribution of this model is
to build upon a relatively simple base model and simulate each of
these interdependencies separately. Explication of this point
beyond the rudimentary illustrations of this Article would require
considerably more analysis and computation, but the simple
insights in this Article would seem to be of value to a policy
community that has devoted much effort to looking at countries
and greenhouse gas problems as if they were to be analyzed in
isolation from each other. Rather than explicitly model the
second-, third-, and higher-order effects, this Article aims to
demonstrate that such thinking is much needed. The enormous,
all-encompassing importance of the climate change problem
demands at least a complete set of analytical tools for
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understanding why countries and people do the things they do.
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Appendix A
Derivation of conditions of perfect information outcomes
(Figure 2)
As a first step, the conditions are derived for cooperative Nash
equilibria in each of the four subgames. Even though in perfect
information the outcomes are pre-ordained for subgames A, B, and
C, it is useful to solve the game under different conditions to see
when non-cooperation results, and when the parties enter the
different subgames.
As an illustration, consider Subgame A. In order for the U.S.
to LM, it must be true that its payoffs of LM exceed that of not
mitigating:
-1-2x > -1-Ax2
which reduces to the simple condition
Ax > 2
Similarly, in order for China to choose to LM, it must be true
that By > 2. And in order for there to be cooperation—where both
parties choose to LM—each country must believe that these
conditions are satisfied for the other country. If either country did
not believe that the condition was satisfied for the other country, it
would not believe the other would LM, and hence would not itself
undertake the cost of LM, since both countries must LM in order
for the world to avoid climate change damages. Hence, the only
way that a cooperative solution—both countries LM—can be a
Nash equilibrium is if both of the following conditions Ax > 2 and
By > 2 are satisfied, and both countries believe that both conditions
are satisfied.
Undertaking a similar solution analysis of Subgame B (where
the U.S. undertakes EM but China does not), the U.S. will only
undertake LM if the payoffs of LM (-1-4x) exceed the payoffs of
not mitigating and accepting climate change (-1-Ax2), which
reduces to the condition Ax > 4. The only way that a cooperative
solution—both countries LM—can be a Nash equilibrium is if
both of the following conditions are satisfied, and both countries
believe that both of the conditions are satisfied:
Ax > 4 and By > 4.
The same result obtains in Subgame C, where China
undertakes EM but the U.S. does not.
In Subgame D, where neither the U.S. nor China undertakes
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EM, the only way that a cooperative solution—both countries
LM—can be a Nash equilibrium is if both of the following
conditions are satisfied, and both countries believe that both of the
conditions are satisfied:
Ax > 6 and By > 6.
The conditions for a cooperative Nash equilibrium in each of
the subgames are summarized in the table below.
Conditions for Cooperative Nash Equilibrium
Subgame A
Ax > 2 and By > 2
Subgame B
Ax > 4 and By > 4
Subgame C
Ax > 4 and By > 4
Subgame D
Ax > 6 and By > 6
Under perfect information, the solution to subgames A, B, and
C are all the same: cooperation in avoiding damages from climate
change. Conceptually, this is because under perfect information
each player knows whether ultimately the other player will
cooperate, and if there is no possibility that the other player will
cooperate, neither player would bother with EM. Therefore
subgames A, B, and C would never take place.
Formally, consider the U.S.’s decision environment (the same
analysis can clearly be done for the China side). If the U.S. does
EM, then it must, knowing what China will do in each period, have
determined its payoff of EM was greater than not doing EM.
Assume first that China is the type to do both EM and LM,
meaning that the parties are in Subgame A. That means that the
U.S. prefers outcome 1 to outcomes 3 and 5 (outcomes 2 and 4 do
not occur because China will EM):
-1-2x > -4x and -1-2x > Ax2
or, in other words,
x > ½ and Ax  2  1
x

so on the U.S. side the condition for a cooperative Nash
equilibrium Ax > 2 is necessarily satisfied, since the condition
1 is a more stringent one.
Ax  2 
x

Now suppose China was the type to not do EM but do LM
(the U.S. knows that China has a perception of high damages but a
low discount factor), meaning that the parties are in Subgame B.
This means the U.S. prefers outcome 2 to outcome 4 and outcome
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5, or:
-1-4x > -6x and -1-4x > Ax2
or, in other words,
x > ½ and Ax  4  1
x

so that on the U.S. side the condition Ax > 4 for a cooperative
Nash equilibrium in Subgame B is necessarily satisfied.
And finally, if China was the type to do neither EM nor LM,
the U.S. would never do EM.
Now turning to a formal derivation of the conditions for a
cooperative Nash equilibrium shown in Figure 2, consider the
illustrative case Ax > 6 and 4 > By > 6. It becomes necessary to
solve the game by backward induction. Each of the subgames is
solved and then the conditions for entering the subgames are
derived.
If the parties are in Subgame A, a cooperative Nash
equilibrium occurs, because all that was necessary was that Ax > 2
and By > 2. The same is true for subgames B and C. If the parties
are in Subgame D, however, China will not LM and the parties
will not cooperate, and climate change will occur.
The next step in backward induction is to ask which subgame
the parties will enter.
Case 1: x > ½ and y > ½. The parties will enter Subgame
A—both parties will EM because their discounted payoffs in A are
greater than in any other subgame.
For the U.S.:
-1-2x > -4x because x > ½ so A is better than C
and therefore:
-1-2x > -1-4x so A is better than B
and also therefore:
-1-2x > -6x so A is better than the cooperative outcome in D.
The solution to Subgame D is non-cooperation, because By < 6,
but we still know that A is better than the non-cooperative solution
to D because Ax > 6, so we know -1-2x > -6x > -Ax2.
For China, the same analysis applies, except that the last step
cannot be inferred, because By < 6. However, we know that:
-1-2y > -4y > By2 because y > ½ and because By > 4.
So for Ax > 6, 4 < By < 6, x > ½ and y > ½, the solution is a
cooperative outcome in Subgame A.
Case 2: x > ½ and y < ½. The parties will enter Subgame
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B—only the U.S. will EM, but both parties will LM because its
discounted payoffs in B are greater than in any other subgame.
For the U.S.:
-1-4x > -6x > Ax2 because x > ½ and because Ax > 6 so B is
better than D.
For China:
-4y > -By2 because By > 4, so B is better than D,
and
-4y > -1-2y because y < ½ so B is better than A.
So for Ax > 6, 4 < By < 6, x > ½ and y < ½, the solution is a
cooperative outcome in subgame B.
Case 3: x < ½ and y > ½. The parties will enter Subgame
C—only China will EM but both parties will LM because its
discounted payoffs in B are greater than in any other subgame.
For the U.S.:
-4x > -6x > Ax2 because Ax > 6 so C is better than D.
For China:
-1-4y > -6x > By2 because y > ½ and because By > 4, so C is
better than D.
So for Ax > 6, 4 < By < 6, x < ½ and y > ½, the solution is a
cooperative outcome in subgame C.
Case 4: x < ½ and y < ½. The parties will enter Subgame D,
and neither party will LM.
For China:
-1-4y < -6y because y < ½ so D is better than C, and
-1-2y < -4y because y < ½ so B is better than A
If D is better than C and B is better than A, then China will
never EM.
For the U.S., the same is true—D being better than B and C
being better than A also means that the U.S. will never EM.
The parties will thus enter Subgame D, and the outcome will
be non-cooperation because By < 6, so China will not LM, and
knowing this, the U.S. will not LM.
So for Ax > 6, 4 < By < 6, x < ½ and y < ½, the solution is a
non-cooperative outcome in Subgame D.
Case 4 is nevertheless an interesting case because there is an
unstable Nash equilibrium involving both players doing both EM
and LM. None of the conditions above establish that:
-1-2x < -Bx2 or that -1-2y < -By2
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And if somehow both parties were able to coordinate and
agree to do EM, then the parties would actually enter Subgame A
where they would rationally both do LM, since we know that Ax >
6 and By > 4. The problem is that doing the EM to enter Subgame
A is a classic prisoner’s dilemma—the dominant strategy for both
players is to defect, or avoid EM. If China knows that the U.S.
will EM, then China’s dominant strategy is to not EM.
Symmetrically, this is true of the U.S. as well.
A similar analysis can be undertaken to solve the game by
backward induction for each of the other possibilities of Ax and
By, and examining for each case what happens under different
assumptions of pairs of x and y. It can be seen that intuitively, the
discount factor falling below ½ means that the country will not
EM. Depending on values of A and B, then, a cooperative Nash
equilibrium may or may not occur.
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Appendix B
Derivation of conditions for feasibility of a period 1 side payment.
Suppose that:
Ax > 6 and By < 2
Referring to Figure 2, the outcome would be non-cooperation
and no mitigation whatsoever. The U.S. would not EM, because it
knows that China will do nothing to mitigate.
However, if Ax is large enough, then the U.S. could afford a
large-enough side payment to induce China to undertake EM and
LM. A side payment could put both the U.S. and China into
Subgame A.
For the players to be in Subgame A it must be true that in
period 1:150
-1-2x > -Ax2 and -1-2y > By2 (3a)
And once in Subgame A, in order for there to be a cooperative
Nash equilibrium, it must be true in period 2 that:
Ax > 2 and By > 2 (3b)
Conditions 3a and 3b must be satisfied in order for both the
U.S. and China to do both EM and LM. But since we are
assuming that By < 2, at least initially there is no Chinese appetite
for mitigation, so there would be no cooperative Nash equilibrium.
But if the U.S. would be willing to make a side payment in the
amount of s so that:
-1-2x-s > -Ax2 and -1-2y+s > -By2 (4a)
putting the players in Subgame A, and also (dividing through
by -x and -y to reflect that the side payment was made in an earlier
period, and must be backward-discounted):
s
Ax  2  and By  2  s (4b)
x

y

so that once in Subgame A, a cooperative Nash equilibrium
obtains. So the game would play out with both players happily
and efficiently undertaking both EM and LM, with payoffs of
{-1-s-2x, -1+s-2y}.
150
In addition to these conditions, the discount rates must be low enough so
that Subgame A is preferred to the other subgames. For illustrative purposes,
this condition is assumed to be true. Whether discount rates are actually low
enough would not change the nature of the analysis of whether side payments
would be made or not.

